A feasibility study of the Search Fund model for the Finnish market by Järvinen, Mikko
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE FINNISH SEARCH FUND MODEL 
 
A feasibility study of the Search Fund model for the Finnish market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master’s Thesis 
Mikko Järvinen 
Aalto University School of Business 
Master's Programme in Entrepreneurship and 
Innovation Management 
Spring 2019 
 Aalto University, P.O. BOX 11000, 00076 AALTO 
www.aalto.fi 
Abstract of master’s thesis 
 
 
 
Author  Mikko Järvinen 
Title of thesis  The Finnish Search Fund Model 
Degree  Master of Science in Economics and Business Administration 
Degree programme  Master's Programme in Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management 
Thesis advisor(s)  Johannes Gartner & Peter Kelly  
Year of approval  2019 Number of pages  65 Language  English 
Abstract 
Search fund is an investment vehicle that provides an aspiring entrepreneur with opportunity to 
search for, acquire, manage, and grow a company. Since 1983, 258 U.S. search funds have returned 
aggregate ROI 8.4x and IRR 37%. Search funds have been identified in UK, Spain and Germany, but 
not in the Nordic. 
Search fund model can provide advantages for both investors and searchers. Investors are able to 
invest in young talent and established micro-growth companies, which are typically beyond the 
reach of the traditional private equity model. Searcher are able to become CEOs of running busi-
nesses with significant equity stake early in their careers. 
In order to evaluate the feasibility of the search fund model on Finnish market, the qualitative study 
aims to identify strengths and weaknesses perceived by potential Finnish searchers and investors. 
The study asks if Finnish market has enough potential searchers who have the required skills and 
traits, potential investors who would be willing to provide the required search and acquisition capi-
tal, and potential targets to support multiple search funds. 
The study shows a market opportunity for no more than 4 to 8 searches annually in next ten years. 
Raising search stage funding is identified as a key bottleneck, which may be effectively mitigated by 
introducing a catalyst to champion the model. 
 
 
Keywords  search fund, search funds, entrepreneurship through acquisition, private equity, buy-
out, feasibility study, entrepreneurship 
 
 Aalto-yliopisto, PL 11000, 00076 AALTO 
www.aalto.fi 
Maisterintutkinnon tutkielman tiivistelmä 
 
 
 
Tekijä  Mikko Järvinen 
Työn nimi  The Finnish Search Fund Model 
Tutkinto  Kauppatieteen maisteri 
Koulutusohjelma  Master's Programme in Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management 
Työn ohjaaja(t)  Johannes Gartner & Peter Kelly 
Hyväksymisvuosi  2019 Sivumäärä  65 Kieli  Englanti 
Tiivistelmä 
Search fund on sijoitusinstrumentti, joka tarjoaa yrittäjäksi aikovalle mahdollisuuden etsiä,hankkia, 
johtaa ja kasvattaa yritystä. Vuoden 1983 jälkeen Yhdysvalloissa perustetut 258 search fundia ovat 
tuottaneet yhteensä 8.4 kertaisen sijoitetun pääoman tuoton ja 37% efektiivisen koron. Search fun-
deja on löydetty UK:sta, Espanjasta ja Saksasta, mutta ei toistaiseksi Pohjoismaista. 
Search fund –malli lupaa hyötyjä sekä sijoittajille että yrittäjäksi aikoville. Sijoittajat voivat sijoittaa 
uransa alkuvaiheessa oleviin lahjakkuuksiin ja kasvupotentiaalisiin mikroyrityksiin, jotka eivät ole 
perinteisen privaty equity –mallin kannalta kiinnostavia kohteita. Yrittäjäksi aikovat voivat päästä 
toimitusjohtajaksi ja merkittäviksi osakkaiksi uransa alkuvaiheessa. 
Tämä tutkielma arvioi Search fund -mallin soveltuvuutta Suomen markkinalle. Laadullinen tutki-
mus pyrkii tunnistamaan vahvuuksia ja heikkouksia, joita yrittäjäksi aikovat sekä sijoittajat havait-
sevat mallissa. Tutkielma pyrkii selvittämään löytyykö Suomen markkinalta riittävästi yrittäjäksi 
aikovia, sijoittajia sekä kohteita useamman Search fundin tarpeisiin. 
Tutkielma osoittaa markkinapotentiaalin 4-8 Search fundille seuraavan kymmenen vuoden aikana. 
Hakuvaiheen rahoituksen arvioidaan olevan keskeinen pullonkaula mallille. Tätä pullonkaulaa voi-
daan lievittää tuomalla markkinalle ”katalyytti”, joka vie mallia eteenpäin. 
 
 
Avainsanat  search fund, search funds, entrepreneurship through acquisition, private equity, buy-
out, feasibility study, entrepreneurship 
 
 Table of Contents 
1. Introduction ​1 
1.1 Research Objectives ​1 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis ​2 
2. Literature review ​4 
2.1 Introduction to Search Funds ​5 
2.2 Search Fund as a Career Choice ​6 
2.3 Search Fund as an Asset Class ​9 
2.4 Search Fund Market Potential ​15 
2.5 Summary on Literature Review ​20 
3. Methodology ​22 
3.1 Design and Approach ​22 
3.2 Context and Sampling ​24 
3.3 Data Collection and Analysis ​26 
3.4 Trustworthiness and Ethics ​29 
3.5 Summary on Research Methodology ​30 
4. Findings ​32 
4.1 Search Fund as a Career Choice ​32 
4.2 Search Fund as an Asset Class ​39 
4.3 Summary on Findings ​54 
5. Discussion and Conclusions ​55 
5.1 Discussion on Search Funds as a Career Choice ​55 
5.2 Discussion on Search Funds as an Asset Class ​56 
5.3 Conclusions ​58 
5.4 Limitations of the Study ​60 
5.5 Suggestions for Further Research ​60 
References ​62 
Appendix ​66 
 
 1. Introduction 
Search fund model provides “an aspiring entrepreneur with opportunity to search for, 
acquire, manage, and grow a company” (A Primer on Search Funds, 2013). Search fund 
process begins with a searcher, typically a recent MBA graduate, raising equity capital to fund 
a 12 to 36 month process of searching an ideal acquisition target. After discovering the target 
company, the searcher negotiates the transaction and becomes a CEO and partner of the 
company. 
Originated by H. Irving Grousbeck of Stanford University's Graduate School of Business in 
1984 (A Primer on Search Funds, 2013), the search fund model has provided phenomenal 
returns to both investors and entrepreneurs since its conception. This niche investment 
vehicle targets “the least efficient segment of private equity market”, namely micro-growth, 
where traditional private equity funds often have challenges to operate profitably (Johnson, 
2015).  
In U.S. and Canada, Stanford GSB (Pohlmeyer and Rosenthal, 2016) has identified 258 
search funds, which have returned an aggregate ROI 8.4x and IRR 37%. IESE (Kolarova et al, 
2016) has identified 48 international funds, mainly located in UK, Mexico, Spain, Brazil and 
Germany. However, no active search funds have yet been identified in the Nordic countries. 
Search Fund literature has not provided an answer on why the model is not employed on this 
market. 
With 78.000 Finnish small and medium businesses having an owner-manager retiring within 
a decade (Haavisto, 2017), Finland is facing a succession problem. Out of the 78.000 
owner-managers, 30.000 believe to sell their company outside of family, and 20.000 expect 
to pass their company inside the family (Varamäki et. al, 2015). Could this present a market 
opportunity for the search fund model to be employed in Finland? 
1.1 Research Objectives 
This study aims to examine the feasibility of the search fund model on Finnish market. The 
feasibility study follows the lines of Justis and Kriegsmann (1979): The focus is on exposing 
the strengths and weaknesses of the search fund model, and objectively assessing its 
prospects for success in the Finnish market. The study emphasizes what Justis and 
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 Kriegsmann would call market research or market feasibility, which is arguably the most 
critical risk when introducing existing products (or in this case, models) to new markets. 
How to determine if the search fund model feasible in the Finnish market? The key actors on 
search fund model are the searchers, investors, and owner-managers selling their businesses. 
To determine the prospects for success, we would need to understand if our (considerably 
smaller compared to the ones mentioned above) market have enough: 
● Potential searchers who have the required skills and traits to search, acquire and grow 
businesses. Is the model attractive for experienced managers or entrepreneurs? 
● Potential investors who would be willing to provide the required search and 
acquisition capital. Do they find the search funds to be attractive as an asset class? 
● Potential target companies (matching a criteria) to support multiple search funds. 
Adapting the Justis and Kriegsmann (1979) definition of a feasibility study, this study aims to 
shed light on the strengths and weaknesses perceived by the potential searchers and investors 
in the Finnish market. From the selling business owners’ perspective, the model differs very 
little from other means of selling the business. Therefore, this study focuses on the market 
size of potential target companies instead of the perceptions of the sellers. 
The research objective of this study is formalized into three research questions: 
● RQ1: What strengths and weaknesses do potential Finnish searchers see in search 
funds as a career choice? 
● RQ2: What strengths and weaknesses do potential Finnish investors see in search 
funds as an asset class? 
● RQ3: What is the search fund market potential in Finland, and how many searches 
can it support? 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
This introduction is followed by the literature review chapter. The literature review aims to 
summarize the current body of knowledge on search funds, especially from the perspective of 
the three research questions. In addition, the literature review describes the theoretical 
frameworks and how they are used to develop hypotheses for the study.  
Methodology chapter describes the overall research design and approach, as well as how and 
why the specific methods selected. Context and sampling, as well as how the data collection 
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 and analysis methods were used is described in detail. The methodology chapter owes to Saija 
Katila and Johannes Gartner of Aalto University for introducing the author to the relevant 
tools and concepts of qualitative research. The chapter is closed with discussion of 
trustworthiness and ethical considerations. 
The findings chapter outlines the key empirical findings of the study. Three of the highlighted 
themes are related to search funds as a career choice, and six focus on search funds as an 
asset class. The former are describing the findings related to potential searchers, and the 
latter focus on findings related to potential investors. The findings on potential targets and 
the market potential is covered already in the literature review section. 
Discussion and conclusions aims to answer the research questions, and tie the answers to the 
findings in this study. Answers are also evaluated against the selected theoretical framework, 
and the wider search fund body of knowledge. The final chapter is closed with conclusions 
regarding the feasibility, and recommendations for both practical implementation and future 
research. 
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 2. Literature review 
The literature review aims to provide a description of the search fund model, and summarize 
the current body of knowledge on the topic. The review approaches the topic from three 
perspectives, based on the research questions. The review begins by evaluating search funds 
as a career choice and as an asset class, and closes with an estimate on the market size based 
on the number of potential acquisition targets in Finland. 
All three perspectives are first approached with search fund literature typically describing the 
model on US market. Secondly, these US based findings and data is discussed in context of 
the Finnish market. Finally, by introducing selected theoretical frameworks, the three 
hypotheses regarding the feasibility on Finnish market are developed. 
The literature review relied on recommended readings from Prof. Peter Kelly of Aalto 
University as a starting point. Recommendations included the often cited publications from 
Stanford GSB, IESE and Harvard Business Review. Majority of the cited search fund 
literature seems to consist of reports and online sources, as only few peer-reviewed articles 
were found with keywords “search fund model” or “entrepreneurship through acquisition”. 
Out of the 35 results, only two peer-reviewed articles were found relevant for the study. After 
removing newspaper articles, case studies for educational purposes, and results not related to 
this specific search fund concept, only articles by Morrissette and Hines (2015) and Hunt and 
Fund (2012) remained.  
Following an advice from Tapio Passinen of Tesi, the literature review was expanded through 
contacting the key authors on search funds, and requesting for any relevant additions to 
authors and publications in references. In total, seven of the authors responded to requests. 
As most of these authors described the reference list as exhaustive, the scope of the review 
was considered sufficient to the few received additions. 
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 2.1 Introduction to Search Funds 
Figure 1: The four stages of the search fund process (A Primer on Search Funds, 2013) 
A search fund is described as an “investment vehicle that allows an aspiring entrepreneur the 
opportunity to search for, acquire, manage, and grow a company” (A Primer on Search 
Funds, 2013). Instead of starting up a new business from scratch, a search fund enables the 
entrepreneur to jump on established businesses with steady revenue and earnings. 
Search fund model provides advantages for both investors and searchers (Johnson, 2015). 
Investors are able to invest in “least efficient segment of the private equity market (the micro- 
growth market)” and “high-caliber talent early in their career”, backed by experienced 
investors. Searcher are able to become CEOs of running businesses with significant equity 
stake. 
The search fund process has four stages: fundraising, search and acquisition, operation, and 
eventually an exit (A Primer on Search Funds, 2013). Essentially, “search fund is a pool of 
capital” allocated for the search stage. The search efforts of the entrepreneur is financially 
supported by the search fund, as modest salary and administrative costs are covered by the 
search capital. 
Once the entrepreneur has found a target company and negotiated the acquisition, the 
entrepreneur raises additional capital for the acquisition. The search stage investors typically 
have a right of first refusal, and provide majority of the acquisition capital. Whether they 
decide to invest or not, their search fund capital is converted to shares of the target company. 
Returns are realized by growing and developing the company towards trade sale or other 
liquidity event. 
Stanford GSB’s search fund study has identified 258 funds in U.S. and Canada (Pohlmeyer 
and Rosenthal, 2016). The number of new funds is also on the rise: Over 9 funds are raised 
each year in U.S. and Canada since 2007, reaching peak levels in 2014 and 2015 with 38 and 
43 new funds. In addition, IESE has identified 45 international search funds (Kolarova et al, 
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 2016). Of these funds 12 were in the U.K., and 9 were in Continental Europe. However, no 
funds have been identified in the Nordic countries. 
2.2 Search Fund as a Career Choice 
Search Fund Data 
Figure 2: Post-MBA experience and professional background of North American searchers 
(Pohlmeyer and Rosenthal, 2016) 
Most search fund entrepreneurs are “relatively young, recent business school graduates” 
(Pohlmeyer and Rosenthal, 2016). Some 60% of the entrepreneurs in new North American 
search funds raised in 2014-2015 had graduated from an MBA program within three years of 
raising their fund, and 73% were under 36 years old. Searchers are increasingly coming from 
schools other than Stanford, and more searchers are 3–5 years out of business school as often 
as newly-minted MBAs (Dennis and Laseca, 2016). 
According to Pohlmeyer and Rosenthal (2016), “Searchers come from diverse backgrounds, 
although individuals with a private equity background represent the largest cohort with 27%. 
General/line management, management consulting, investment banking, and other 
represented the four next most common professional backgrounds for searchers”. 
Johnson (2015) points out how searchers have the opportunity to develop themselves as 
businesspersons. Through the search fund process, the searchers learn to assess and 
negotiate deals, raise bank debt, and deal with uncertainty. Search process also prevents the 
searcher from buying a bad business. 
The recent MBA graduates are bearing a high opportunity cost by choosing the search funds: 
“Many post-MBA compensation packages include a high starting salary and a signing bonus, 
the principal of a search fund commands a relatively lower income” and uncertain upside 
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 (Pohlmeyer and Rosenthal, 2016). The opportunity cost can be even higher for experienced 
managers with MBAs, which can explain the profile of relatively young graduates. 
After studying unsuccessful search fund acquisitions, Kessler and Ellis (2012) have drawn 
recommendations regarding the qualities of the searcher. They claim that a successful 
searchers should be transparent and willing to work with their board of directors. They 
should be able to listen to their board, be willing to learn from the board, and have the 
humility to recognize and admit mistakes. The searchers needs to be able to adapt to a 
leadership position, retaining key employees, making appropriate hires and motivating the 
team. 
Ruback and Yudkoff (2017) add a few additional desired skills and traits. To succeed at 
acquisition entrepreneurship, searchers need basic management skills, including 
understanding of finance. In addition, searchers need confidence and persuasive ability to 
project optimism towards business brokers, investors, sellers, and the employees and 
customers they inherit. They also need persistence, the ​“fortitude to bounce back” after 
hardships in​ both search and operation stages. Searchers need to be enthusiastic learners: In 
search stage they need “to quickly get up to speed on unfamiliar industries, sectors, and 
companies”, and eventually ​become knowledgeable about the business they acquire. 
Common motivations shared by those who raise search funds include “a desire to own, 
manage, and build a company” without starting the company around your own idea from the 
scratch ​(A Primer on Search Funds, 2013)​. They “desire to realize high financial upside” 
aiming for considerable returns for their investors and themselves, but also enjoy the search 
process as “they gain an experience of becoming immersed in multiple industries over a short 
period of time.” ​Acquisition entrepreneurship can be considerably less risky path than 
founding a startup, while providing the professional independence rarely available in large 
companies ​(​Ruback and Yudkoff 2017). 
The Finnish Perspective 
With limited number of MBA graduates, the Finnish searchers are more likely to hold other 
degrees, such as Master of Science in Technology or in Economics and Business 
Administration. To demonstrate the required skills and traits, the searchers are also likely to 
have some years of management experience before embarking on a funded search. 
With a total of 35 000 alumni, Aalto university alumni network could present a source of 
prospective searchers. Majority of the alumni with management experience are likely to be 
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 non-entrepreneurs employed in larger companies, with little or no previous entrepreneurial 
experience.  
These experienced managers may be subject to stronger career and family handcuffs than 
recent MBA graduate. According to Wasserman (2012), social status, high salary, vesting 
schedule, spouses and children can reduce the likelihood of founding a startup. Similarly, 
these factors may prevent experienced managers to choose search funds as a career choice. 
Startup companies could provide another source of Finnish searchers. As majority of the 
companies fail, there is a pool of experienced entrepreneurs constantly looking for new 
opportunities. These individuals often have the desired skills and traits, but more 
importantly, often weaker career handcuffs and built-in taste for professional independence. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Shane and Venkataraman (2000) have pointed out that the decision of entrepreneur to 
exploit an opportunity is affected by nature of the opportunities and individual differences. 
In order to exploit an opportunity, the entrepreneur needs to evaluate expected 
entrepreneurial profit to be more valuable than the opportunity cost of other alternatives, 
and provide additional premium for bearing uncertainty (Kirzner and Schumpeter, cited in 
Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). As the decision to exploit an opportunity is also influenced 
by individual’s perceptions of the downside risk, the higher willingness to bear the risk 
influences the decision to exploit opportunities (Khilstrom, Laffont, and Knight, cited in 
Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). 
The potential searchers with no entrepreneurial experience may have previously decided not 
to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities because of the perceived downside risk or low profit. 
However, search fund model appears to have lower survival and exit/liquidity risk (Hunt and 
Fund, 2012), but higher expected returns (Pohlmeyer and Rosenthal, 2016; Wiltbank and 
Brooks, 2016) than startups with angel investment. As search funds have the potential to 
provide more profitable and less riskier path to entrepreneurship, this lead us to the 
hypothesis: 
H1: Potential searchers see higher expected entrepreneurial profit, lower uncertainty
and lower downside risk as search fund’s advantage over startups. 
If individuals have developed useful information for entrepreneurship from their previous 
employment, they are more likely to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities (Cooper, Woo, and 
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 Dunkelberg, cited in Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Prior entrepreneurial experience 
reduces learning costs related to exploitation, and therefore increases the probability of 
exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunity (Carroll & Mosakowski, cited in Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000). 
In addition, the desire for independence has been identified as a prime motivation for 
starting a business (Shane, Locke & Collins, 2003). Other entrepreneurial motivation traits 
do exists, such as locus of control and need for achievement, but these motivations have been 
identified amongst managers as well as founders. As potential searchers are expected to have 
reduced learning costs related to exploitation and higher desire for independence, the study 
makes a following hypothesis: 
H2: Potential searchers see independence and ability to leverage their experience as 
search fund’s advantage over employment.  
2.3 Search Fund as an Asset Class 
Search Fund Data 
As an asset class, search funds appear to outperform both VC start-up stage investments and 
angel investments in North America. Through end of year 2015, search funds tracked by 
Stanford GSB had achieved an aggregate ROI of 8.4x and an IRR of 36.7% (Pohlmeyer and 
Rosenthal, 2016). While angel investments in US were estimated to have an aggregate ROI of 
2.5x and IRR of 22% (Wiltbank and Brooks, 2016), the VC start-up stage investments had to 
settle for aggregate ROI of 2.1x and IRR of 29%. 
In addition to higher aggregate IRR returns, search funds display less survival risk and 
exit/liquidity risk (Hunt and Fund, 2012). Companies acquired through search funds have 
90% survival rate, whereas companies backed by angel investments and start-up stage VC 
investments have significantly lower 35% survival rate. In 2005-2010, 12% of all search funds 
resulted in exits through strategic M&A with no IPOs. At the same time, only 4% of angel 
investments and 9% of start-up stage VC investments resulted in M&A or IPO. 
The median search fund investment is profitable: 52% of the search funds result with capital 
gains for the investor (Pohlmeyer and Rosenthal, 2016). Out of these, 11% deliver ROI of over 
5x. 27% of search funds result in no acquisition, and additional 21% in total or partial loss of 
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 invested acquisition capital. In comparison, both the median angel investment and start-up 
stage VC investment result in loss (Hunt and Fund, 2012). 
The average holding period of a company acquired through search fund process is seven years 
(Dennis and Laseca, 2016), reflecting the “investor's willingness to hold strong assets for the 
long term”. The period is over 55% longer compared to an average angel investment holding 
period of 4.5 years, and even longer in relation to VC fund investments (Wiltbank and 
Brooks, 2016). 
Private equity buyout funds share some operational similarities with search funds, but differs 
not only in the size of acquired companies, but also in performance: US based private equity 
buyout funds have delivered lower returns than search funds with ROI of 1.9x and IRR of 
13.4% (Global Private Equity Report, 2017). Surprisingly, private equity displays only 
marginal reduction in survival risk and exit/liquidity risk: 37% of investments by PE funds 
lead to loss, including 8% leading to full loss of invested capital (A New Arrow in the Quiver, 
2017). The focus on larger companies does not seem to proportionally lower the risk. 
In U.S. and Canada based search funds, there are typically more than ten investors 
purchasing more than one unit of the search capital (Dennis and Laseca, 2016). There are 
usually 10 to 20 units in each fund, valued in the range of $15K to $40K per unit. The median 
search capital per entrepreneur in North America has grown from $262,500 in 2009 to 
$390,000 in 2015 (Pohlmeyer and Rosenthal, 2016). 
In the acquisition stage, company valuations typically range from $5 million to $20 million 
(Pohlmeyer and Rosenthal, 2016). In Stanford GSB data, the median purchase price to 
EBITDA ratio was 5.8x, and the median price to sales ratio was 1.5x. According to Pohlmeyer 
and Rosenthal (2016), “the equity portion of the acquisition tends to range from $1 million to 
$10 million, which typically represents 40 to 75 percent of the total purchase price”. Rest of 
the purchase is often funded with long term debt and seller financing. Total purchase price 
per investor typically varies from $100K to $1 million. 
The searcher generally receives a 15-30 percent equity stake in the acquired company (A 
Primer on Search Funds, 2013). The investors in the search capital stage are rewarded with 
additional premium, as their “search capital is commonly stepped up by certain percentage 
(e.g., 50 percent)” when converted to target company shares. The post-acquisition ownership 
of a target company with a $5 million equity portion might be divided with 10 percent to 
search investors, 70 percent to acquisition investors and 20 percent to the entrepreneur.  
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  Search Fund Business angel 
investment 
VC start-up 
investment 
Private equity 
buyout funds 
Aggregate ROI 8.4x 2.5x 2.1x 1.9x 
Aggregate IRR 36.7% 22% 29% 13.4% 
Company 
survival rate 
90% 35% 35% 92% 
Exit rate 12% 4% 9% NA 
Return < 1x 48% 70% NA 37% 
Average holding 
period 
7 years 4.5 years 3 years 5.2 years 
Company 
valuation 
$5 million to 
$20 million 
$4 million 
(average) 
NA $100 million to 
$5 billion 
Table 1: Search funds compared to other asset classes on US market (Pohlmeyer and 
Rosenthal, 2016; Wiltbank and Brooks, 2016; Hunt and Fund, 2012; Dennis and Laseca, 
2016; Global Private Equity Report, 2017; A New Arrow in the Quiver, 2017) 
The Finnish Perspective 
From the perspective of Finnish angel investors, the investment sizes in North American 
search fund may seem large. As described above, search funds generally require individual 
investor to commit in the range of $15K to $40K to the search capital, and from $50K to $1 
million to the acquisition capital. In contrast, the median investment of Finnish angel 
investor is only €20K (Finnish Business Angels Network, 2017). For many Finnish angel 
investors, a single search fund investment is likely to equal the whole angel investment 
portfolio. 
In fact, the North American investment sizes are closer to the Venture Capital and Private 
Equity funds. In 2016, these funds invested €450M in over 350 Finnish portfolio companies 
(FVCA, 2018), while angel investments totaled to €53M in 324 companies in 2016 (Finnish 
Business Angels Network, 2017). Average investment size with venture funds was €590K, 
while buyout funds invested €6.3M on average. 
As long term debt typically covers 40 to 75 percent of the acquisition price, banks are a key 
element of the Finnish search fund model. In addition to commercial banks, Finnvera, 
specialized financing company owned by the State of Finland, is active on the field of changes 
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 of ownership and management transition. In 2016, Finnvera financed approximately 1,000 
management transition with a total of 141 million euros (Finnvera, 2017). 
Another source of funding for the acquisition stage can be seller financing. With seller 
financing, the purchase price can be paid in future installments, or the payments can be 
triggered based on pre-set events. The shares of the seller could also be converted to 
subordinated long term debt. 
Theory and Hypothesis 
Agency theory and incomplete contracting theory have been widely used to explain the 
relationship between entrepreneurs and investors (Lahti, 2008). In this study, the two 
theoretical frameworks are used to build predictions on how Finnish investors would perceive 
the opportunity to invest in search funds. 
According to the agency theory, if both the agent (entrepreneur or searcher) and principal 
(investor) are utility maximizers, the agent may not always act in the best interests of the 
principal (Jensen & Mecklin, 1976). The opportunity for adverse selection arises from 
asymmetric information, where the principal does not know what the agent knows, and 
enables moral hazard, where the agent can use the information disparity for his own benefit. 
To resolve the problem, both parties need to commit to agency costs: Principal may need to 
incur monitoring costs, such as due diligences and rigorous reporting. Agent may need to 
incur bonding costs, such as loan collaterals or vesting periods, to guarantee he is not going 
to take actions harmful for the principal. In practice, these contracts can rarely fully align the 
agent’s decisions with the decisions that maximize the welfare of the principal. Jensen & 
Mecklin describe this third type of agency cost as the residual loss. 
On the other hand, the incomplete contracting theory questions the rationality of contracts 
that incur monitoring and bonding costs (Lahti, 2008). Specifically, models of transaction 
costs and bounded rationality, neither considered in agency theory, highlight the contractual 
incompleteness. The transaction cost model suggest that the monitoring and bonding costs 
are likely to exceed the benefits that they can bring to the principal (Spier, cited in Lahti 
2008). The bounded rationality model suggests that principals and agents are limited in their 
ability to evaluate and foresee all possible contingencies, making ex-ante contracts covering 
all contingencies unfeasible (Spier, Hart, Van Osnabrugge, cited in Lahti 2008). 
12 
 Both theories have been used to analyze the funding decisions by angel investors, venture 
capital fund managers and bankers (Mason and Stark, 2010). Angel investors tend to behave 
more in the lines of incomplete contracting theory, placing greater emphasis on evaluating 
the entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team and investor fit instead of introducing bonding and 
monitoring costs. As fund managers are typically better informed and resourced, and in 
better position to incur post-investment agency costs, they can focus on market and financial 
issues instead of the entrepreneur in their evaluation. Bankers also rely on agency costs, 
focusing on collateral and in-depth financial analysis before the loan decision. 
With the search fund model, the searcher enters into contract with investors twice: initially 
when raising the search stage investment, and later when raising funding for the acquisition. 
As there is no company (and in case of opportunistic search, often even no market) to analyze 
in the initial search stage, the investment opportunity needs to be solely evaluated through 
the searcher’s plans and qualities. Essentially, the investor enters the negotiation with 
immense disparity in information: he is almost fully dependent on searcher as an information 
source.  
Search stage investors assess the searcher’s “search strategy, industry choices, company 
screening criteria, and planned search process”, but also the “subjective traits” of the searcher 
(Johnson, 2015). According to Johnson, the traits include “intellectual horsepower, 
disciplined and rational thinker, problem-solver, prepared (vs. casual), good selling skills, 
good communicator, resourceful, entrepreneurial, demonstrated past success, shows 
willingness to listen, open and transparent, humble.” 
The standard Stanford GSB search fund model (A Primer on Search Funds, 2013) has very 
little post-ante monitoring and bonding costs built into it. After committing to the initial 
search stage funding, investor has little direct control over the searcher – as a principal, he or 
she can only try to influence on how and where the search is proceeding, but cannot pull the 
commitment back during the search. On the other hand, the searcher is getting his salary 
paid during the search process, may he or she be acting in the best interests of the investor or 
not. 
However, having freshly graduated MBAs from top business schools as searchers can be seen 
as a bonding cost. These searchers are incurring a considerable opportunity cost by deciding 
to work for a search fund instead of taking a corporate position with sign-up bonuses and a 
six-figure annual salary. Through this opportunity cost, a searcher-MBA resulting with failed 
search will share also the downside with his search stage investors. This can also influence 
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 the perceptions of Finnish investors, as the opportunity cost (following the standard Stanford 
GSB model) may be significantly lower for Finnish searchers. 
On the other hand, the acquisition stage funding on the standard Stanford GSB search fund 
model (A Primer on Search Funds, 2013) has more elements of agency costs in place. 
Investors are typically taking board seats in the target company. Searchers are receiving a 
considerable equity stake in the target company, aligning their interests with their investor’s 
interests. The equity is vested based on performance indicators, set in place by the investors. 
The senior lenders have low financing risk, thanks to the strong EBITDA and moderate 
leverage. Essentially, the model is rewarding searcher as an agent only after the investors 
have been rewarded. 
It seems that the two stages of the search fund are following distinctively different logic: 
Search stage is declining towards incomplete contracting theory, avoiding monitoring and 
bonding costs in order to keep transaction costs low. Acquisition stage declines towards 
agency theory, emphasizing post-investment monitoring and bonding costs. 
Lahti (2008) has researched the behaviour of Finnish business angels, using incomplete 
contracting and agency costs as theoretical frameworks. The research indicates that Finnish 
business angels are behaving “much in accordance with the principal agent approach of 
venture capitalists”, being very selective and performing comprehensive due diligences. 
Combined with the findings of Mason and Stark on fund managers and bankers (2010), we 
can assume that Finnish fund managers and bankers are not likely to put less emphasis on 
the transaction costs, leading to the following hypothesis:  
H3: Potential investors in Finland are more attracted to invest in the acquisition stage 
compared to the search stage 
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 2.4 Search Fund Market Potential 
Search Fund Data 
 
Figure 3: Most commonly targeted industries (Pohlmeyer and Rosenthal, 2016) 
Search funds have often preferred business service firms more than other types, but recently, 
acquired companies come more often from other industries (Dennis and Laseca, 2016). The 
new industries include Internet/information technology (IT), healthcare, education, but also 
manufacturing (Figure 3). 
The GSP Search Fund Primer presents a common set of criteria for target industries and 
companies (A Primer on Search Funds, 2013). Desirable industries are fragmented, growing 
and sizable, both in revenues and number of companies. They are relatively early in industry 
life cycle, have straightforward industry operations and high number of companies in target 
size range. Consolidated and declining industries, with limited barriers to entry and 
unpredictable exogenous factors, are deemed undesirable. 
The company criteria focuses naturally on the health and sustainability of the business and its 
revenues (Kessler and Ellis, 2012). Solid middle management, customer base and competitive 
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 advantage are desirable, but also recurring revenue model is perceived as an advantage. The 
seller is ideally motivated for non-business reasons: Ruback and Yudkoff (2017) point out 
retirement, poor health, divorce, inability of business partners to get along and death of the 
owner as common situations. The company also needs to have multiple avenues for growth, 
and a realistic liquidity options in 3-6 years. 
The acquired companies have a median revenue of $7.2 million and $1.8 million of median 
EBITDA (Pohlmeyer and Rosenthal, 2016). Trailing annual EBITDA growth rate is 12 
percent, and the median company has 45 employees. 25% of companies were purchased for 
$4 million to $8 million, 24% for $8 million to $12 million, and 39% for $12 million or more. 
Johnson (2015) positions search funds as “too small for institutional investors and too large 
for most groups of angels”. In US market, “companies with EBITDA below $5 million are not 
attractive”, and something that is omitted by traditional private equity activities. This enables 
searchers to acquire companies with lower market multiples, and sell them with higher 
multiples once the companies have grown beyond $5M EBITDA. 
One of the reasons why U.S. based search fund investors are enthusiastic of the model is the 
pool of available small businesses and the aging American demographic (Dennis and Laseca, 
2016). Dennis and Laseca estimate over 220K businesses with between $5 to $50 million in 
revenue in the U.S., where 51% of business owners over the age of 55. That means that 
approximately 100K businesses, representing over $1 trillion of value (assuming an average 
EV of $10 million), will need some form of management transition and/or liquidity event in 
the next 10 years. 
Primer on Search Funds (2013) describes a funnel for the search fund process. Based on 
Stanford GSB data, one successful acquisition required 500 identified companies in 2011, and 
306 in 2009. With international search funds, “the mean number of companies reviewed 
before a successful acquisition” by single search fund totaled 216 (Figure 4) in 2014-2015 
(Kolarova et al, 2016). 
However, number of identified companies required for successful acquisition may be much 
larger. According to Kiessig and Chess (2013), Brown Robin Capital needed 2,000 first calls 
to brokers or business owners to complete the search. Best practices for the search phase 
-report (Stern, 2014) introduces a funnel where a searcher did 3,404 outbound postal mails, 
generating 256 responses, to secure 2 letters of intent. However for this case, there is no 
detailed information on the initial targeting for outbound mails.  
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 Figure 4: Search Fund funnel (Kolarova et al, 2016) 
The Finnish Perspective 
What would be the market potential on a considerably smaller market, such as the Finnish 
market? The Federation of Finnish Enterprises estimates that over 78k Finnish small and 
medium businesses have entrepreneur over 54 years, facing the retirement of the owner 
within a decade (Haavisto, 2017). The number represents 28% of total 283k Finnish 
companies, after agriculture, forestry and fishing have been excluded. 
Out of the 78k entrepreneurs, 30k believe to sell their company outside of family, and 20k 
pass their company inside the family (Varamäki et. al, 2015). Federation has also published 
brokers, researchers, bankers’ estimates of total of 35k actually realizing some type of 
business transfer within the next 10 years (Haavisto, 2017). Rest of the companies are 
expected to close down or fade away. 
However, majority of the 78k companies are small. Varamäki et. al (2015) puts most of the 
companies in micro-category, with 86% employing 10 or less and 68% employing less than 5. 
In contrast, in US based search funds median sales at purchase is $7.2M and the smallest 
identified is $0.4M (Pohlmeyer and Rosenthal, 2016), making these Finnish micro-sized 
companies typically smaller than the targets in US. This should turn the Finnish searchers’ 
focus to the remaining 14% and 11k companies.  
On the other hand, the lower threshold for private equity and buyout funds may be smaller in 
Finland than in US. Table 2 lists five Finnish private equity / buyout general partners, known 
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 of their focus to smaller companies. All of them have portfolio companies with less than 
€10M revenues, and two have even ones under €5M revenue. As only 10% of the total 
portfolio is in under €5M companies, and 40% in under €5M, the focus of the smaller private 
equity companies is clearly in the companies with revenues above mentioned. 
The Orbis database (2018) identifies a total of 9,101 Finnish companies with between €5 to 
€50 million in revenue, while the Official Statistics of Finland (2015) identifies 2,731 
companies in the revenue range of €10 to €40 million. The number represents some 1-3% of 
all Finnish companies, and compares to some 5% of the US market defined by Dennis and 
Laseca (2016). 
However, the picture changes if the focus is shifted to lower range. Orbis identifies 20,906 
companies between €1 to €5 million in revenue, and Official Statistics of Finland has 11,547 
companies in revenue range of €2 to €10M. This focus would widen the universe of potential 
targets to 4-7% of all Finnish companies, and avoid bidding contests with private equity. 
General partner Portfolio 
companies with 
revenue < 
€10M 
Portfolio 
companies with 
revenue < €5M 
Smallest 
portfolio 
company name 
Smallest 
company 
revenue 
Evolver 5 out of 7 2 out of 7 Refix Ab €2.5M 
Helmet 7 out of 14 2 out of 14 Fifax Ab €1.0M 
Juuri 3 out of 10 0 out of 10 Puuha Group €5.0M 
Korona 4 out of 10 0 out of 10 Normiopaste €5.4M 
Vaaka 2 out of 11 1 out of 11 Evolta €4M 
Average 40% 10%  €3.6M 
Table 2: Portfolios of Finnish private equity funds with focus to smaller companies (based 
on information published on the websites of the selected private equity funds) 
Estimates on Finnish market 
Table 3 presents three estimates of the market potential, and the number of searches Finnish 
market could sustain. There are three market definitions, ranging from wide to narrow. Wide 
definition includes all companies with €1-5M revenue, essentially bringing the lowest range 
from €5M in the Dennis and Laseca (2016) estimate to €1M to avoid bidding contests with 
private equity. Moderate definition is based on number of 54+ entrepreneurs (Haavisto, 
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 2017) employing over 10 persons. The narrow focuses on €5-50M revenue bracket of Dennis 
and Laseca (2016). 
Kessler and Ellis (2012) have made some recommendations on target financials. Target (or 
industry) should have a minimum of 10% growth rate, and a minimum of 10% EBITDA 
margin. After introducing this criteria to the previous Orbis result, a total of 5,323 companies 
remain in the wide €1-5M revenue bracket, and 1,699 in the narrow €5-50M range. Moderate 
market size is estimated to be in range of 2000 to 3000.  
The number of searches is defined simply by dividing the number of targets with the 500 
identified companies (Primer on Search Funds, 2013) or the 2,000 first calls (Stern, 2014) 
required for an acquisition. Presuming that market gets saturated search by search, ratios 
remain constant, and all searchers identify or contact a company only once, we get a wide 
ballpark estimate of 1 to 42 searches to cover the market. 
As entrepreneurs are constantly getting older and entering the 54+ segment, the supply of 
potential targets replenishes in 10 years, assuming an average retirement age of 64. From this 
perspective, the estimate on number of searches needed to cover the market during a 10 year  
Target market Wide Moderate Narrow 
Market definition All companies with 
€1-5M revenue  
54+ entrepreneurs 
employing over 10 
All companies with 
€5-50M revenue  
Companies in the 
target market 
20,906 ~11,000 9,101 
Matching SF criteria 
of 10%+ EBITDA, 
10%+ rev. growth 
5,323 2000 to 3000 1,699 
Targets covered by a 
single search 
500 to 2000 500 to 2000 500 to 2000 
Searches needed to 
cover all companies 
10 to 42 6 to 22 5 to 18 
Searches needed to 
cover companies 
matching SF criteria 
3 to 11 1 to 6 1 to 4 
Estimated annual 
potential acquisition 
volume for 10 years 
€25M - €36M 
Table 3: Estimated Search Fund market potential   
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 period is assumed to be twice the amount above. When annualized, the Finnish market is 
estimated to sustain less than 8 new searches on wide target market, and less than 4 new 
searches on the narrow target market. 
Assuming an average valuation of €10M for a narrow market company, and €3M for the wide 
market company, the maximum potential value of target companies and search fund 
acquisition would be €25M to €36M annually. Reaching the maximum potential would 
position the search fund market right next to startup angel investments, valued at €53M in 
2016 and €26M in 2017, and crowdfunding valued at €34M in 2016 and €56M in 2017 
(Finnish Business Angels Network, 2017). 
For the scope of this study, the research question of “What is the search fund market 
potential, and how many searchers can it support?” has received a satisfactory answer 
through desk study only, and will be excluded from the empirical stages of the study. 
2.5 Summary on Literature Review  
The literature review and hypotheses can be summarized in the following perspectives: 
As a career choice, search funds seem to attract individuals with a desire to “own, manage, 
and build a company” and “realize high financial upside” (A Primer on Search Funds, 2013). 
The searchers choose considerably lower downside risk compared to founding a startup, 
combined with professional independence rarely available in large companies (Ruback and 
Yudkoff, 2017). As these properties seem to increase the likelihood of individuals pursuing 
entrepreneurial opportunities (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, Locke & Collins, 
2003), two hypotheses related to potential Finnish searchers are developed: 
● H1: Potential searchers see higher expected entrepreneurial profit, lower uncertainty 
and lower downside risk as search fund’s advantage over startups. 
● H2: Potential searchers see independence and ability to leverage their experience as 
search fund’s advantage over employment. 
As an asset class, search funds appear to outperform angel, early stage VC and private equity 
investments (Pohlmeyer and Rosenthal, 2016; Wiltbank and Brooks, 2016; Global Private 
Equity Report, 2017; Hunt and Fund, 2012; A New Arrow in the Quiver, 2017). However, 
search stage investments are likely to require investors to behave according to the incomplete 
contracting theory. As bankers (Mason and Stark, 2010) and Finnish angel investors (Lahti, 
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 2008) tend to behave more according to the agency theory, the following hypothesis on 
potential investors is developed: 
● H3: Potential investors in Finland are more attracted to invest in the acquisition stage 
compared to the search stage 
Regarding the search fund market potential in Finland, the literature review is able to reach a 
satisfactory conclusion without proceeding to the empirical stage of the study. With total 
addressable market of 9,000 to 21,000 small and medium companies, the Finnish market is 
estimated to sustain less than 8 new searches on wide target market (companies with €1-5M 
revenue), and less than 4 new searches on the narrow target market (companies with €5-50M 
revenue). 
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 3. Methodology 
Methodology chapter begins with a description of overall design and approach, aiming to 
explain the research tradition the study is built upon. The rationale for the selected type of 
feasibility study and qualitative (instead of quantitative) approach is also given in the 
beginning of the chapter. 
The chapter continues to describe the context of the study, and also the selected sampling 
strategies. Data collection and analysis methods provide the details of the study: Which 
methods were selected and why, and how the data was actually collected and analyzed. The 
chapter is closed with discussion of trustworthiness and ethical considerations. 
3.1 Design and Approach 
Feasibility study 
In contrast to engineering and medicine, it appears that feasibility studies have somewhat 
less academic tradition within management studies. During the initial read-in stages, only a 
few feasibility studies were identified in peer reviewed journals such as Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, Journal of Business Venturing and Journal of Small Business 
Management. 
According to one of the more often cited articles by Justis and Kriegsmann (1979), a 
feasibility study can aid in business creation or expansion: “By presenting and analyzing all 
relevant information such a study can show the resources needed for a proposed venture, 
expose its strengths and weaknesses, and objectively assess its prospects for success.” 
Approaching feasibility studies from construction development perspective, Young (1970) 
offers a definition in more simple terms: an economic feasibility of a development project is 
judged simply based on cost and value. The cost factors are generally studied first, including 
construction and operation costs. The value is estimated through market studies, by 
predicting demand and revenue. Only if the capitalized value exceeds the costs, the project is 
justified. 
For this study, Youngs concepts of value and cost may be less purposeful. Instead of specific 
investment opportunity, the study is focusing on the feasibility of the overall search fund 
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 model in Finnish market. To determine an exact value and cost as Young guides us, the study 
should focus on a single search fund investment case, and possibly on more limited pool of 
stakeholders. The results of this approach would likely be applicable only in very specific 
context. 
Instead, this study follows the lines of Justis and Kriegsmann (1979): The focus is on 
exposing the strengths and weaknesses of the search fund model, and objectively assessing its 
prospects for success in the Finnish market. The study emphasizes what Justis and 
Kriegsmann would call market research or market feasibility, which is arguably the most 
critical risk when introducing existing products to new markets. 
Young, Justis and Kriegsmann discuss the aims and content of a feasibility study, but offer 
little insight on the approach, designs and overall methodology. Feasibility studies seem to 
vary in approaches, ranging from desktop studies relying on existing data (e.g. Eronen, 2017) 
to qualitative (e.g. Lindqvist, 2016) and more quantitative ones (e.g. Shahin, 2011). There for, 
feasibility study as such does not limit the approaches a researcher can take. The approach 
selected for this specific study is described in detail in the next chapter. 
Qualitative approach 
This feasibility study follows a qualitative approach, “attempting to make sense of, or to 
interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them” (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2000). The qualitative approach has been selected for three key reasons: 
1. Research questions focus in the stakeholders’ perceptions and insights regarding the 
feasibility of the search fund model. As qualitative study is aims to build a more 
holistic understanding of the research topic (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008), it should 
be suitable for capturing wider variety of the perceived strengths and weaknesses. In 
contrast, where quantitative approach could provide more structured and 
standardized data collection and analysis, it’s theory-driven and fixed research design 
may lead to undesirably narrow focus and inflexibility.  
2. Access and availability of data somewhat limits the research approach. As no search 
funds have been identified in Finland (Kolarova et al, 2016), the feasibility cannot be 
determined based on existing numeric data only. Therefore, numeric data collection 
would be effectively limited to surveys. With a rather marginal research topic, surveys 
are likely to face insufficient sample sizes, reducing the trustworthiness and 
usefulness of the results. 
23 
 3. Search fund model doesn’t currently seem to be very well known topic. To collect 
meaningful insights from various stakeholders, the study needs to first inform 
stakeholders of the search fund model. This requirement does not rule out the use of 
surveys as main data collection method, but may introduce uncontrolled variables, 
and fail to capture much of the data from spontaneous feedback of the stakeholders. 
The study draws elements from a number of qualitative research traditions, of which action 
research is the most evident. The focus on solving a practical problem and the close 
collaboration with the research object are characteristic often associated to action research 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). A feasibility study is also a great basis for action planning, 
implementation and evaluation, which are typical steps after data analysis in action research. 
The theoretical perspective of the study follows constructivist, interpretivist and even 
phenomenological epistemologies. These perspectives assume that “the world does not 
present itself objectively to the observer, but is known through human experience, which is 
mediated by language” (Burr, cited in Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). From this perspective, 
the feasibility of the search fund model is merely a social construct: The research object exists 
only in the verbally expressed experiences of the research participants. 
3.2 Context and Sampling 
The context of the study is highly focused on the Finnish market, and on the feasibility of the 
search fund model described in the literature section. As the research instruments are based 
on the model, empirical results can hardly be generalized outside of this narrow context. For 
example, findings cannot be directly generalized to cover all models of entrepreneurship 
through acquisition, of which search fund is only a specific one. 
However, in qualitative research, generalizability deals with representative samples (Yin, 
cited in Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). With well-grounded selection of participants, and a 
number of results supporting a previously developed theory, replication can be claimed 
through analytic generalization. Therefore, emphasis is on well-argued sampling. 
Potential searchers sample 
The key sampling strategy can be characterized as convenience sampling or backyard 
research, as the data collection began with organizations and individuals already familiar to 
the researcher (Glesne, cited in Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). The selected strategy lowers 
barriers for access and helps in developing more detailed contextual knowledge. As a 
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 downside, the strategy may add additional bias: a backyard researcher may more easily mix 
normative beliefs and intuition with research evidence and facts. 
Aalto alumni in Finance, Aalto alumni in industrial engineering and Haaga-Helia MBA 
students were selected to represent experienced managers that could be potential searchers. 
These groups were seen to provide best compromise in terms of access, volume and 
equivalence to the profile of international and U.S. based searchers. 
1550 potential searchers received an email with brief description of the search fund model, 
and an invitation to an event where they could learn more and participate the study. In 
addition to the direct emails, some of the participants learned of the event though 
word-of-mouth and online channels. Total of 12 potential searchers participated the study. 
Potential investors sample 
With potential investors, the initial backyard sample was broadened with snowball sampling 
and purposeful sampling (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). With snowball sampling, 
researcher interviews one person and asks her to name others that could be included in the 
study. Purposeful sampling relies on pre-selected criteria and lists of organizations and 
individuals to choose from. 
In this study, Talouselämä Yrityskaupat -database (Talouselämä, 2018) was used to identify 
Finnish organizations who have recently been active in acquisitions of Finnish small and 
medium enterprises. Only organisations with finance as their primary industry (TOL 64-67) 
were selected for interviews. Expert opinions were used to select the most relevant 
individuals and organizations to participate. 
Potential searchers Potential investors 
Four focus groups with: 
- 5 Aalto Alumni 
- 4 Haaga-Helia MBA students 
- 3 Others 
Think aloud interviews with: 
- 2 Debt financiers 
- 2 Business angels 
- 2 Fund managers / Angel investors 
- 3 Family office managers 
- 3 Transaction advisors 
- 1 Institutional investor 
- 1 PE/Buyout fund manager 
- 1 Wealth management 
12 Total 15 Total 
Table 4: Sample of potential searchers and potential investors 
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45 potential investors received an email invitation to participate the study. Investors included 
Finnish business angels, fund managers, family offices, institutional investors and debt 
financiers (commercial banks). Total of 15 potential investors participated the study, out of 
which 7 were reached through backyard sampling, 3 through snowball sampling, and 5 
through purposeful sampling. 
3.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
Wide range of data collection methods can be used in action research (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2008). With the previously discussed limitations, i.e. lack of existing data and 
epistemological positions, focus groups and think-aloud interviews were selected as data 
collection methods. These methods also enabled the use of the broad body of knowledge on 
search fund model as research instruments. 
Focus groups with potential searchers 
Focus groups have been used in business research context to study consumer attitudes, needs 
and perceptions, but also experts’, managers’ and peoples’ viewpoints and beliefs (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2008). It is also one of the few research methods that emphasize interaction 
between participants, which can enable them to become “a forum for change”. As the search 
fund model was likely to be relatively unknown to the participants, the interaction was 
expected to help participants in making sense and verbalizing their perceptions. 
Focus groups can also encourage participation of individuals who are reluctant to be 
interviewed on their own (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). On the other hand, some people 
may feel unwilling to discuss in a group, which might be the case when digging deeper on 
more sensitive topics. As motives for career choices can be sensitive, there is the possibility 
that participants were not too keen on discussing all topics. 
The potential searchers were invited to Aalto University and Haaga-Helia UAS campuses for 
two hour events to learn about search fund model. The events started with an introduction to 
the search fund model (Appendix A), a case on entrepreneurship through acquisition 
(Appendix B), and continued as a facilitated focus groups for the last hour. 
The participants were randomly divided to groups with 3 participants and one trained 
facilitator. Only few participants had met or knew each other before. Focus groups were given 
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 a topic of “Search funds as a career choice”. The facilitators followed a predetermined 
interview guide, with following themes/questions: 
1. Introduce the theme and context 
2. Introduce the participants 
3. What did you think about the case(s)? 
4. As a career choice, how would you compare search fund to a startup? 
5. As a career choice, how would you compare search fund to corporate job? 
6. Could you see yourself as a principal of a search fund? 
7. What would prevent you to become a search fund principal today? 
8. Wrap up and summarize 
The audio from focus group discussion was recorded with consent. No video was recorded. 
Think-aloud interviews with potential investors 
Think-aloud interviews enable participants to verbalize their thoughts, emerging as a task is 
being completed (Salkind, 2010). The method has been previously used in entrepreneurship 
studies, especially for understanding how various stakeholders evaluate investment and 
entrepreneurial opportunities (e.g. Mason and Stark, 2004; Read et. al., 2009). 
In this study, potential investors were presented with investment memorandums of a 
fictional search fund cases (Appendices C, D and E). The participants were given a scenario, 
where their colleague would approach them with the memorandum, and ask their opinion on 
it before making an investment decision. Participants were then asked to think aloud how 
they would analyze the memorandums. 
The case and memorandums were developed based on the existing search fund body of 
knowledge (e.g. A Primer on Search Funds, 2013), and early findings of this study from the 
focus groups with potential searchers. The target companies represented in the 
memorandums were pseudonymized Finnish companies, matching the criteria of successful 
search funds presented by Kessler and Ellis (2012). The case was further revised and 
developed after first interviews. 
The search stage investment memorandums included: 
1. Executive summary on search stage investment (2 pages) 
2. Profiles of potential searcher candidates (1 page) 
3. Budget for the search stage (1 page) 
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 The acquisition stage investment memorandums included: 
1. Executive summary on acquisition stage investment (2 pages) 
2. Financial data on the target company (3-5 pages) 
The interviewer protocol was rather unstructured, with the investment memorandums 
providing some pre-set themes for the interview. The interviewer presented some probing 
question throughout the interview, and answered the interviewees questions related to the 
search fund model. 
The audio from think-aloud interviews was recorded with consent. No video was recorded. 
Qualitative content analysis 
The data was analyzed following the qualitative content analysis as formulated by Philipp 
Mayring (2014). Mayring describes the method as mixed method approach, where the 
assignment of categories to text is a qualitative step and the analysis of frequencies of 
categories a quantitative one. 
Data is analyzed using more data-driven, explorative design instead of a theory driven, 
descriptive design. The design was selected to bring up the full variety of perceived strengths 
and weaknesses, instead of findings directly related to the theory. Categories were formulated 
inductively out of the text, instead of a theory based, deductively formulated category system. 
A summarizing content analysis was used to reduce the material and create a comprehensive 
overview of the data. Data of potential searcher focus groups and potential investors’ 
interviews were analyzed separately. In the first operation, recording unit was a single 
interview, and in the second the whole material. A paragraph was selected a coding unit for 
the first operation, and a paraphrase for the second round. 
After these two operations, 2 main categories from potential searcher data and 7 main 
categories from potential investors emerged. Where appropriate, the frequencies of 
paraphrases under the main categories were presented in the findings. 
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 3.4 Trustworthiness and Ethics 
Conformability, credibility, dependability, and transferability 
With constructivist qualitative research and subjectivist epistemology, classic evaluation 
criteria of validity, reliability and generalizability may not be suitable for evaluating 
trustworthiness. Eriksson & Kovalainen (2008) recommend using evaluation criteria that is 
more suitable for this constructivist and subjectivist philosophies. For this study, notions of 
conformability, credibility, dependability, and transferability (Lincoln and Guba, cited by 
Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008) are used to evaluate the trustworthiness.  
Dependability is emphasized in the clear description of sampling strategies, data collection 
and analysis methods. In addition, all research instruments have been included as 
appendices to the study. This aims to make the research process as traceable and documented 
as possible. 
Transferability is pursued through the selection of mainstream theoretical frameworks, such 
as the nature of entrepreneurial opportunities (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000), agency 
theory and incomplete contracting theory. The nature of the feasibility study is to reflect the 
findings with existing search fund literature and the Finnish market insights. 
Credibility is built on various factors, including the comprehensive literature review on 
search fund topic. The findings are based on relatively large body of qualitative data, 
consisting of 4 focus groups and 15 interviews conducted for the purpose. In the findings 
chapter, links from observations to categories should be transparent, albeit the full breadth of 
data cannot be efficiently communicated. 
Conformability, in terms of linking findings to the data may leave room for improvement. The 
selected data analysis method is rather subjective, and highly susceptible for various bias. 
Using triangulation of researchers on data analysis and category formation could have led to 
discovery of findings that may have been overlooked. Unfortunately, the scope of the thesis 
research did not allow triangulation. 
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 Ethical considerations 
Research ethics in qualitative business research is most often related to access and 
data-collection methods. Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) point out how surprisingly little 
attention is given to the relationship between researcher and the researched person. 
Elliot (cited in Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008) identifies three different variations of general 
relationship between researcher and researched, and the ethical implications of the 
relationship. The researcher can be (A) detached and remains neutral, or (B) marginally 
participant, or (C) active participant enabling changes to take place. 
With A-type relationships, ethical considerations can be seen as simply contractual ones. 
These include common practices such as voluntary participation and informed consent. For 
this specific study, all participants were invited with a written email describing the purpose 
and context of the research, and introducing stakeholders such as the sponsor of the study. 
The data was promised to be treated confidentially, and published only anonymously. 
B/C-type relationships, typical for action research, bring up more complex ethical questions 
arising from close relations developing during the research project. In addition to anonymity 
of the informants, confidence creation, and “sensitivity and respect for the values and 
interests of those studied persons” become more relevant (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008). 
The B/C-type relationships can become relevant after the feasibility study has been 
completed. In case the search funds are founded based on the study, informants may have 
interests and expectations for the implementation stage. However, the results of the study 
may or may not support the interests and expectations, and even fuel conflicting interests. 
As there are no special ethical review boards monitoring ethical issues related to the topic, 
Aalto University Code of Academic Integrity and Handling Violations (Aalto University, 
2013) and the guidelines of the Finnish Advisory Board on Research Integrity (TENK, 2012) 
are key ethical guidelines directing this study. 
3.5 Summary on Research Methodology 
The feasibility study follows the approach described by Justis and Kriegsmann (1979), 
focusing on exposing the strengths and weaknesses of the search fund model, and objectively 
assessing its prospects for success in the Finnish market. A qualitative approach, drawing 
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 from action research tradition, is selected because of the nature of the research questions, 
access to data, availability of data, and the relatively low awareness of the subject matter. 
Multiple sampling strategies were used for the study, and 12 potential searchers and 15 
potential investors participating. Focus groups (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008) with 
potential searchers and think-aloud interviews (Salkind, 2010) with potential investors were 
conducted for data collection. Presentations and investment memorandums, based on search 
fund literature, were used as research instruments. The data was analyzed with summarizing 
qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2014). 
Following constructivist tradition, notions of conformability, credibility, dependability, and 
transferability (Lincoln and Guba, cited by Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008) were used to 
evaluate the trustworthiness. As the researcher is an active participant in this study, ethical 
considerations span beyond access and data collection methods (Elliot, cited by Eriksson & 
Kovalainen 2008). 
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 4. Findings 
This chapter presents the findings of the feasibility study. The findings are organized under 
nine main categories, identified through the inductive process of summarizing qualitative 
content analysis (Mayring, 2014). The hypotheses are tested after the findings related to the 
two open research questions have been presented. 
First three categories are focusing on search funds as a career choice, aiming to shed light on 
RQ1 and the first two hypotheses: “Potential searchers see higher expected entrepreneurial 
profit, lower uncertainty and lower downside risk as search fund’s advantage over startups” 
(H1) and “potential searchers see independence and ability to leverage their experience as 
search fund’s advantage over employment” (H2). 
The last six categories are focused on search funds as an asset class. These categories reflect 
the views of potential investors (RQ2) and test the third hypothesis, stating that “Potential 
investors in Finland are more attracted to invest in the acquisition stage compared to the 
search stage” (H3). 
4.1 Search Fund as a Career Choice 
Independence attracts to search funds, financial security to employment 
After hearing two presentations (primer by Prof. Peter Kelly and a case study by the author) 
on search funds (Appendix A and B), the potential searchers were organized to focus groups. 
The focus groups were given a topic to discuss search funds as a potential career choice. 
Amongst other topics, potential searchers were asked to compare search funds to 
employment as a career choice. 
Autonomy, freedom, and independent decision making were seen as advantage for search 
funds in three focus groups. A potential searcher mentioned how corporate politics would 
draw him towards search funds. Quite a few potential searchers mentioned how they are 
lacking opportunities for independent decision making in their current positions: 
“At this point I would rather go to search fund, I have a corporate job and I am 
facing a challenge. Maybe it is the question of decision making, having more 
decision power in your own hand.” (Focus group III, potential searcher #7) 
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 “I’m a manager in a restaurant. The owners are in their 50s and have retired, they 
are not very interested in new things and you don't start anything new anymore. I 
am feeling that I am stuck: I get to make a lot of decisions, but they are still the 
owners that I need to get approval from.” (Focus group III, potential searcher #8) 
“Search fund probably gives you that freedom in terms of how you do it. You do 
what is your own right and you have a target, and work the way that you see the 
target is achieved.” (Focus group I, potential searcher #1) 
Business owners getting better returns was mentioned in two focus groups. One focus group 
had a discussion starting from job security, pointing out that secure jobs in corporations are 
vanishing. And if there is no job security to begin with, why not make your own money 
without limited upside and equal risk?  
​“As an employee, you don't get that kind of return as you can get through owning a
business” (focus group II, potential searcher #4) 
Key disadvantage, shared by two focus groups, was financial insecurity. Employment was 
seen to give more security in terms of financials. Safe monthly salary was seen as difficult to 
let go, and the searcher was seen as a risk taker. On the other hand, one focus group 
discussed that search fund could actually provide better financial security with a 12-18 month 
contract. A searcher said that with an angel investor support, he would be willing to try. 
 Perceived search fund 
advantages 
Perceived search fund 
disadvantages 
Compared to 
employment 
More independence (n=3) 
Better returns (n=2) 
Opportunity to learn (n=1) 
Financial insecurity (n=2) 
 
Table 5: Perceived search fund advantages and disadvantages over employment and the 
number of focus groups with occurrences of the category 
Return versus risk favors search funds over startups as a career choice  
When compared to startups, Search funds were seen to provide better returns compared to 
risk in all four focus groups. Potential searchers were aware how raising funding for a startup 
can be a challenge, and how majority of startups go bad nevertheless. Factoring in the high 
chances of failing, search funds were seen as a more profitable option. Buying and old 
company was seen as less risky, and also better from time investment perspective: 
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 “It doesn’t probably make a huge difference if you are searching for a larger 
company or an idea to start your own business with. So if it takes the same time, but 
you have a larger vehicle to get into, it obviously should be more lucrative for you.” 
(Focus group II, potential searcher #5) 
“If you buy an older company that has customers, you will start making money 
faster than you would have in starting from the beginning.” (Focus group III, 
potential searcher #7) 
A focus group consisting of Aalto finance alumni discussed how good quality search and well 
done homework can lead to a very low risk position. Spending 1-2 years on finding a target 
company should result in much better target companies, than with a typical VC approach. 
Additionally, search fund path had less risk of diluting on follow-up equity rounds: in the end 
of the day, a searcher and startup founded can end up with equal shares of equity. 
Operations being already up and running was mentioned as an advantage on three focus 
groups. Having customers, reputation and sales was seen as a way to avoid the “early stage 
grinding” and “tumbling in the dark” to discover a feasible business model. For a few 
potential searchers, these stage was also not seen as very inspiring professionally. One felt 
that he could leverage his experience in making business decisions better at an established 
company. In addition to more tangible features, a culture was also mentioned as an asset: 
“This [search fund] is better: you have a running operation, with recurring revenue, 
you have some sort of place on the market, you have some assets, and if you are 
lucky, a culture of using those stuff in the right way.” (Focus group I, potential 
searcher #1) 
“Startup from the zero level is kind of scary, in that way you would think that this 
would be perhaps more secure way to buy an old company that has sort of a lot of 
customers, have sort of reputation.” (Focus group III, potential searcher #8) 
Search funds were also seen to provide more opportunities. Contrary to startups, search fund 
structure could be used for merging multiple businesses, and for generating returns through 
use of loan leverage only, without any growth. One of the potential searchers mentioned how 
startups were limited to your own ideas: with search fund approach, you would have a larger 
universe of opportunities to select of. 
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  Perceived search fund 
advantages 
Perceived search fund 
disadvantages 
Compared to 
starting a new 
business 
Better return vs risk (n=4) 
Running operation (n=3) 
More opportunities (n=3) 
Leveraging skills (n=2) 
Requires experience (n=2) 
Takeover risks (n=2) 
Less cool (n=1) 
Table 6: Perceived search fund advantages and disadvantages over starting a new business 
and the number of focus groups with occurrences of the category 
The ability to leverage skills with search funds was mentioned in two focus groups. The group 
consisting of Aalto finance alumni pointed out that their experience would enable them to 
analyze companies, to get funded for a good target, and focus on financial side that is often 
neglected in small companies. Another potential searcher referred to his leadership 
experience, which could be used to keep people on track in larger companies than startups 
The focus groups resulted with considerably less disadvantages for search fund model. One 
focus group was not able to point out a single disadvantage, and another one came up only 
with search funds being “less cool at the bar” than startups. The idea was that startups are 
currently enjoying a “superhero mythos” compared to machine shops, which may be 
important for some startup founders - and also for some investors. 
Main disadvantage compared to startups was the need of more experience and networks, 
which was mentioned in two interviews. Leadership skills, industry knowledge, finance and 
investment were seen as required skills for the searcher, and networks were seen important 
for finding co-founders and investors: 
“Has to have a person that understand the business but also has the right kind of 
contacts.” (Focus group IV, potential searcher #10) 
“You needs skills like leadership, management, a good seller, you need to be able to 
sell your ideas.” (Focus group I, potential searcher #2) 
Risks related to takeover were mentioned also in two focus groups. Potential searchers 
thought that clients may disappear if they are too tied to the previous owner. The company 
may carry liabilities you are not aware of, unlike with a startup that enables you to get started 
on a clean sleet. A potential searcher also mentioned how business transfers can take many 
years, so getting to actually run the company might take more time than with startups. 
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 Opportunity cost and lack of knowledge hold potential searchers back  
Before closing the focus groups, participants were asked what would prevent them to become 
searchers today. The categories and subcategories of preventing factors identified from the 
focus group data is presented in the table (7). 
Category of preventing factors Sub-categories 
Opportunity cost (n=4) Current commitments (n=3) 
Needs to accept the risk (n=3) 
Human capital (n=3) Needs to know the model better (n=3) 
Lacks skills and experience (n=2) 
Lacks market knowledge (n=2) 
Financial capital (n=2) Personal finance (n=2) 
Social capital (n=2) Lacks networks 
Needs a team 
Other (n=2) Not a showman 
Family situation 
Table 7: Perceived factors preventing potential searchers to start a search and the number 
of focus groups with occurrences of the category 
Current commitments, such as a startup or a decent job, was mentioned in three focus 
groups. One potential searcher pointed out that he would need to give up current salary and 
carrying advance options to pursue search funds, which he felt increased his opportunity 
costs. Another one pointed out that current commitments prevent going for search today, but 
he may be interested in future: 
“I may be a searcher, if the startup initiative doesn’t turn out well.” (Focus group IV, 
potential searcher #11) 
Accepting the risk was mentioned in three focus groups. One potential searcher mentioned 
that he clearly wasn’t a risk taker, and another two mentioned the need for additional 
confidence to accept the risk. These can be also interpreted as an opportunity cost, where 
searchers have less risky and equally attractive career options. 
Three focus groups mentioned that they would need to know search fund model / 
entrepreneurship through acquisition better before committing to it. Two focus groups 
mentioned needing leadership, management and sales skills, tools and experience on running 
a business. These also mentioned the need to know the market, industry and business 
environment better. 
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 “I think I need a bit more experience about running businesses, but I feel I have the 
qualities that you would need for this. I am curious by nature, when I am interested 
in something I really get into it, I have determination, I am usually very good with 
people.” (Focus group III, potential searcher #7) 
“I’m interested, but I would need to know the market, the business, and have the 
right tools and confidence to proceed.” (Focus group IV, potential searcher #10) 
“Course on entrepreneurship through acquisition would be interesting.” (Focus 
group II, potential searcher #6) 
Two focus groups mentioned personal finance as a preventing factor. One participant 
considered needing a buffer of liquid funds before committing to a search. In addition to lack 
of financial capital, lack of networks and team members were mentioned in two focus groups:  
“It is about finding a team. It is a cliché but nevertheless, finding a soulmate to look 
from different angle at the same stuff. So if you are a good leader, good with people 
and then you need to have another guy who is good with number. I am good 
communicator and get people along the track, but I’m not this sort of character who 
wakes up in the morning and okay P times 2 is this much and this much.” (Focus 
group I, potential searcher #1) 
One participant mentioned how he felt that he missed the “genes” to become a searcher. He 
felt that the position would require a person with more showmanship, being more 
convincing, and enjoying attention. One participant mentioned family situation as a 
preventing factor, although it also provided the opportunity to review next career choices: 
“I am actually staying at home with my small child, focusing on that, and having 
actually another one on the way, so it is a natural point I think in my career to think 
what I want to be doing after all this.” (Focus group II, potential searcher #6) 
Hypotheses regarding search fund as a career choice 
Based on the findings from focus groups, the first hypothesis of “potential searchers see 
higher expected entrepreneurial profit, lower uncertainty and lower downside risk as search 
fund’s advantage over startups” receives fair amount of support. All four focus groups have 
occurrences of the category “better return vs risk” when comparing search funds to startups. 
In three of these focus groups, the categories of having a “running operation” and “more 
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 opportunities” saw also occurrences. These two categories may be contributing factors to the 
perceived “better return vs risk”. 
Two of the focus groups had occurrences of the category “takeover risks”. As takeover risks do 
not exist in startups, and increase uncertainty and downside risk, these occurrences may be 
interpreted as contradictory to the hypothesis. However, acknowledging their context, these 
occurrences should not be viewed as refuting the hypothesis, but merely to point out that 
search funds are not perceived as risk free. 
The second hypothesis, “potential searchers see independence and ability to leverage their 
experience as search fund’s advantage over employment” is also receiving support. Three of 
the four focus groups have occurrences of the category “more independence” when 
comparing search funds to employment. 
Interestingly, the occurrences of the category of “human capital” in factors preventing 
participants to become searchers can be seen to provide support for the second hypothesis. In 
three focus groups, potential searchers “would need to know the model better”, have 
additional “skills and experience” or “market knowledge”. It might be that it is not the 
experience that attracts the searchers towards the search funds, but the lack of experience 
that keeps them away.  
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 4.2 Search Fund as an Asset Class 
Search fund returns, valuations and opportunities attract investors 
In general, potential investors found the historical search fund returns to be very attractive. 
The aggregate IRR of 36.7% was perceived as much higher compared to what private equity 
investments can deliver. If a private equity fund would be able to deliver equally high returns, 
the carry interest was expected to be very high. However, one interviewee criticized the 
sample of US based search funds to be not relevant for the Finnish market. 
The search fund acquisition multiples were seen as relatively low. Research instruments 
included sample memorandums on acquiring pseudonymized Finnish companies, with their 
valuations calculated using the average market multiples of US search fund acquisitions. The 
price-per-sales ratio of 1.0x and price-per-ebitda of 5.8x and 6.3x was described as well 
negotiated, especially if cash & cash equivalent was included in the price. An interviewee 
mentioned not seeing this low valuations since 2016, typical P/EBITDA being closer to 8x 
today. Another mentioned P/S of 1.5x and P/EBITDA of 8x as the upper limit for investors. 
Potential investors saw market opportunities for Finnish search funds in: 
● Targets too small for private equity, venture and buyout funds (8),  
● Retiring founders and owner-managers facing business successions (5), 
● Turnaround cases with financials not attractive to PE/BO/VC funds (2),  
● Spin-offs from peripheral (non-core) business lines of larger companies (1), and 
● Acquisition instrument for larger companies with entrepreneurial managers (1) 
The targets too small for PE/BO/VC funds were mentioned as a potential market in eight 
interviews. Focusing on companies with revenues less than €10M was also seen to enable 
much larger universe of potential targets on the Finnish market. On the other hand, 
companies smaller than €2M to €5M in revenues were seen as challenging to take over. 
Search funds would likely face competition from VC/PE/BO funds with target companies 
with enterprise value of €20M. There is thought to be less competition with EVs closer to 
€2M, resulting with market multiples even below P/EBITDA of 5x. However, some 
interviewees did mention PEs (namely Vaaka, Juuri, Helmet, Evolver and Korona) targeting 
also small companies with EV starting from €3M to €4M. 
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 Retiring owner-managers facing business successions was discussed in five interviews. 
Business successions were seen as a potentially large source for target companies that have 
not reached their full potential under current management, are overlooking opportunities in 
digitalization or adjacent markets, and are not actively searched by traditional private equity 
funds.  
Deviating from the Stanford GSB search criteria, two transaction advisors mentioned 
turnaround cases as an opportunity. The financials of these businesses are not attractive to 
VC/PE/BO funds, but can have growth opportunities, and may be turned profitable through 
operations streamlining and financial engineering. Turnaround businesses were seen to carry 
higher risks than the ones matching the Stanford GSB criteria, and would likely not enable 
the use of debt leverage. However, this could be attractive option for a self-funded searcher 
with good access to equity financing. 
To widen the search and increase deal flow, the opportunity to focus on spin-offs was 
mentioned by one transaction advisor. By targeting smaller, peripheral business lines in 
larger companies, transactions can be faster and more straightforward in terms of due 
diligence. An interview also mentioned search fund model as a corporate internal 
opportunity: To enter a market through acquisition, a corporate having an entrepreneurial 
manager for the job could adapt the search fund model instead of hiring an investment bank. 
One perspective on market was based on the options for the target business owner. Would he 
be more inclined towards selling to the searcher, or would he prefer selling to competitors or 
acquaintances? Would he consider business brokers, investment bankers or buyout funds? 
One advantage would be the promise of retaining jobs and operations locally, which can be a 
promise that business brokers, investment bankers and even buyout funds cannot give. 
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 The ideal searcher is both experienced and an entrepreneur 
The potential investors were presented with four profiles of potential searchers, and asked to 
evaluate the candidates. The profiles had been designed beforehand based on the attendees of 
the searcher focus groups. The think-aloud approach generated insights on specific searcher 
profiles, but also the following, more general themes: 
● Searcher age and experience were seen to increase the chances of success, 
● Previous entrepreneurial experience is seen as an advantage for a searcher, 
● Professional managers can be more suitable for search funds than startups, 
● Searcher needs a broad set of skills in business, finance and industry knowledge, 
● Searcher should have skills that were not in the target company previously, 
● Trust is seen as essential, and investor should know the searcher well, and 
● A searcher is evaluated more carefully than a VC 
Age and experience were seen to increase the searchers chances of success. Many potential 
investors saw young age and a short experience as a risk, although it was not a clear deal 
braked for the most. A family office manager mentioned seeing best results in companies 
with under 50 year old management, supported by board of directors in their 60s. A few were 
open also for investing in younger talent. 
As the job of the searcher is an entrepreneurs’ job, previous entrepreneurial experience was 
seen as an advantage. A fund manager said a searcher should not need to start learning what 
entrepreneurship is during the search. Having experience only from large corporations was 
seen as a risk. To increase credibility, the searcher should have a track record, ideally a 
successful exit. Essentially, the ideal searcher was seen to be a serial entrepreneur with 
history of successfully employing the search fund model. On the other hand, a transaction 
advisor pointed out that a professional manager can be more suitable to take the search fund 
path instead of founding a startup. 
Ideal searcher was seen to have a multitude of skills. Searcher was seen to require both 
business and finance skills, and good command of accounting. Searcher was also expected to 
have experience on the targeted industry, or the specific stage of the target company life 
cycle. The search stage was seen to require quite specific resources and networks, which could 
be better described in the investment memorandums. A transaction advisor pointed out that 
a searcher should also have skills that were not in the target company previously, to be able to 
unlock some of the unused potential in the target company. 
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 Searcher profile Positive 
mentions 
Negative 
mentions 
Searcher A 
● 30 year old 
● MSc Econ. (Finance) 
● 5 years of experience in investment banking 
and/or private equity 
1 7 
Searcher B 
● 40 year old 
● Bachelor of Hospitality Management, now 
studying MBA 
● 20 years of industry experience specifically 
in catering and food industry 
● 10 years of experience in management 
positions 
5 2 
Searcher C 
● 40 year old 
● Bachelor of Engineering, now studying MBA 
● 20 years of multi-industry experience in 
management positions 
● 10 years of entrepreneurial experience, 
including startup CEO 
6 0 
Searcher D 
● 50 year old 
● MBA, MSc Econ or Tech (Industrial 
Engineering) 
● 25 years of multi-industry experience, 
director positions in TE 500 companies 
● Also some entrepreneurial experience 
and/or VC fund management experience 
7 2 
Table 8: Number of negative and positive mentions per searcher profile 
Trust was mentioned in quite a few interviews. Potential investors would be reluctant to 
invest in a searcher they do not know previously. To invest in search stage, investor should 
have great confidence in the searcher.  Because of the double role of acquiring and running 
the company, a searcher will be evaluated more carefully than a VC. The searchers task was 
seen as more demanding than VCs, although a VC background was seen as favorable for a 
searcher. 
Profile A generated the most negative mentions, varying from moderate considerations to an 
outright no. When analyzing the profile, potential investors noted a lack in experience, which 
was seen as a risk. Profile A was seen to lack substance, be more suitable as an analyst in the 
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 search stage than CEO of the target, and being generally too young. A family office manager 
mentioned how profile A had seen only half of a business cycle during his experience. 
However, with the strong financial angle, the profile A might be having better focus than 
more technically oriented searchers. 
Profile B was seen as a very industry focused, and suitable for a narrow search, although 
some interviewees criticized the experience to be too specific and not entrepreneurial. The 
key advantage of profile B was the industry knowledge: One of the transaction advisors 
pointed out how managers with 20 years of experience are the ones identifying opportunities 
on their industry. A senior lender mentioned how profile B could be suitable to run a target 
company with a revenue less than €10M. 
Profile C was generally seen as a suitable candidate, with no negative mentions in the data. 
With the entrepreneurial experience, there was less need to do learning on the job. According 
to a fund manager, C was also seen as more likely to choose the entrepreneurial career for the 
right reasons. Some potential investors would’ve liked to have more information on how the 
startup did. Technical background was seen as generally well adaptable to a large number of 
businesses. However, a transaction advisor mentioned how some CEO-engineers might have 
the tendency to have an overt focus on product development. 
Profile D was mentioned as the best, most low risk option by most interviewees. A senior 
lender mentioned how people have often accumulated a good understanding on leadership 
and managing people. The candidate was seen as suitable for running companies in the larger 
end of the search fund spectrum. On the other hand, profile D was seen maybe to have too 
much mileage and little appetite for the search. Profile D was expected to have less 
experience and interest for hands-on management of a small company. 
Profile D was also seen more suitable for a self-funded search. A few potential investors 
pointed out that person with this profile should have been able to accumulate enough capital, 
to be able to fund the search stage with no external investors. A fund manager saw both C and 
D suitable for the job, but wondered why they would be interested pursuing a search fund 
instead of other opportunities. 
To evaluate the searchers, a number of interviewees would’ve liked to have information 
beyond the experience, education and age. Does the searcher have the personal qualities of an 
entrepreneur? What is his motivation and vision he believes in? A transaction advisor 
pointed out that psychological tests used by Founder Institute may be suitable for screening 
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 candidates with entrepreneurial traits. A family office manager was less interested in the 
background, but more curious about what the searcher wanted to do in his life. 
Raising search capital is likely to be a struggle for most searchers 
When analyzing a search capital investment memorandum (Appendix C), potential investors 
were struggling to find the value in investing during the search stage. As a manager with an 
institutional investor put it: Would the right of first refusal and step-up be sufficient reward 
for search stage funders? Would the high risk of losing the €15k ticket be worth it?  
Potential investors identified a number of inherent risks in the search stage. If a suitable 
target is not found, the project ends and search capital is lost. The searcher may feel 
compelled to choose an inferior target when time starts running out. Generally risk is 
perceived to be very similar than in sports sponsorship: Is this the athlete that will go to 
Olympics or not?  
Finding investors for the search stage capital was perceived to be a challenge by most of the 
potential investors. According to many interviewees, investors don’t like to pay for the search, 
but for closing the deal. In a small market, the best private investors were thought to already 
have an access to the deals: If the deals are offered to them no matter what, will they see a 
value for paying for the search? 
To make the search stage attractive, searcher should be very experienced and be able to 
provide access to deals that the investor would otherwise miss. One of the angel investors 
mentioned that investing in search stage would require a very experienced and networked 
team, and lot of convincing on how they can provide better access. 
Many potential investors noted that the searcher carries no downside risk in the model. With 
the salary included in the search costs, failing to find a target will lead to only investor losing 
money.  Sharing also risk instead of just the upside, and carrying an opportunity cost, would 
make the search stage investment more attractive. 
Confidence in the searcher can increase, if he invests also himself in the search stage. 100% 
self-funded search makes the searcher even more credible for the acquisition stage. A family 
office manager also pointed out that a searcher could be spending his time better and 
probably getting a better acquisition deal without raising any capital for the search stage. 
Investors appear to be more willing to invest after a target company has been found. 
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 The findings above seem to lead us to a paradox: To be a credible searcher, with experience 
and networks to attract search stage investments, you should have accumulated the financial 
resources for a self-funded search, and be willing to use those resources. 
A single searcher also increases a key person risk, which can be reduced with a team. 
However, more than one searcher limits the search to larger target companies that can carry 
the additional salary expenses. This was also seen to introduce the risk of the searchers 
quarreling. 
Search durations can also be quite long, longer than investors may like to fund. The 18 month 
duration presented in the memorandum was perceived both as too short and too long. At the 
longer end finding a reasonably priced target was thought to take 2-3 years, especially 
because the searcher was seen to start the search with a clean slate. 
The search budget of the investment memorandum was seen as quite generous. The travel, 
office and marketing expenses were seen as unnecessary, especially for a one person 
searching in Finland. The searcher draw or salary was also seen as moderate, although 
interviewees did mention it should be lower than market salaries for the searcher. In general, 
external costs were seen as more acceptable than salaries. 
The cost of due diligence (DD) raised different opinions. The interviewees agreed that full DD 
could not be covered with the budgeted €10k, as the minimum DD expense was estimated to 
be from €30k to €60k even in smaller companies. However, there were different takes on at 
what stage the DD costs should be covered. 
If full DD costs were to be included in the search budget, the search fund would need to 
budget a limited number of DDs. A fund manager mentioned that for one acquisition a 
searcher might need to conduct up to six DDs. After running out of DD budget, searcher 
would need to raise additional search funding, choose less than ideal target, or close the 
search. 
Full DD costs could also be funded separately. With this option, search stage would result 
only with a letter of intent. The acquisition stage investors would need to commit to DD costs 
in addition to acquisition capital. For at least three interviewees, this approach was seen as 
reasonable, but at least one family office manager would prefer to have the DD done 
beforehand. 
45 
 Search stage was also analyzed from perspective of transaction costs: With the €150k search 
budget and additional due diligence costs, the target company EV was expected to be much 
closer to €20M than €2M. 
When discussed on profiles of potential search stage investors, family and friends rounds, 
and also crowdfunding was mentioned as potential sources for search stage funding. Search 
funds were also seen as potential sourcing tool for smaller family offices and business angels, 
without their own search capabilities. Descriptively, one family office manager mentioned 
that they were currently moving from opportunistic investing towards more active search. 
Senior lenders saw the search stage capital clearly as equity, not debt financing from banks. 
As one of senior lenders put it, they are only investing against foreseeable future cash flows, 
which are non-existing in the search stage. From financing perspective, he compared the 
search stage to game or other high-risk product development. 
Search fund acquisition differs little from PE, growth is expected 
Potential investors were asked to analyze two executive summaries of acquisition stage 
investment memorandums (appendices). The summaries included target company 
descriptions and planned post-acquisition strategies. Potential investors were asked to think 
out loud when evaluating the two memorandums. 
When evaluating the target companies, potential investors mentioned following items: 
● Previous owners: Who are the previous owners, and why they have the need to sell? 
Why have they not done what should be done to utilize the full potential? 
● Market study: How is the market developing? How will the company be able to benefit 
of the market growth? Are there entry barriers that benefit the company? 
● Dependencies and risks: How dependent is the company on key customers and 
suppliers? Are there risks in the environment? Any other business and credit risks? 
● Financial analysis: How much debt do the companies currently have? Is there cyclic 
variation in the revenues? What kind of cash flows has the company been creating? 
When evaluating the post-acquisition strategy, potential investors mentioned the following:  
● Growth plan: Why would the company be more valuable in new hands? Where does 
the growth come? What is the growth potential, and the new role of the company in 
the market? How would executing the growth plan affect the company cash flows in 
different scenarios? 
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 ● Overtake plan: How will the overtake happen? What skills does the team have? How 
will the management and organization change? What assets will be liquidated? 
● Exit plan: Is there a consolidation game going on? Who is buying and why? 
A family office manager thought of the executive summary as suitable for raising interest, 
making the reader curious to read more. However, he (and few others) would expect to have a 
full business plan and market study prepared during the search stage. 
In general, the sample companies were seen as attractive acquisition targets. A transaction 
advisor mentioned he would be happy to invest his own money in the Liquid Partners deal 
with the given price. Another said that he would be happy to recommend Blast Proof deal for 
friends and customers. 
Most of the potential investors emphasized the company growth in their evaluations. The 
current revenue and profitability was seen as a baseline, on which a growth strategy would be 
built on. As one fund manager put it, these companies are engines running like a top. There’s 
nothing wrong in them, they are just naturally aspirated, when they could be pressure 
charged. 
Potential investors were also asked to analyze the transaction structure, detailing how the 
acquisition would be funded. With both companies, the stock purchase price was covered 
with 50% senior debt, 20% as equity, 20% subordinated debt and 10% of seller financing. The 
structure was adapted from the search fund literature. 
Generally, the presented structure was seen as a very typical for the private equity world. The 
key differences were the small size of the company in the lower end of the search fund 
spectrum (EV €2M), and the lack of private equity general partner representing the majority 
shareholder from senior lenders perspective. Otherwise there seemed to be little difference if 
the company is found by PE or searcher. 
The use of 50% of senior debt was seen as a moderate. Both of the interviewed senior lenders 
describe the funding structure and the target company fundamentals as attractive as and 
better than typical for banks. A fund manager noted that typically PEs take as much debt as 
they can, minimizing the need of equity. On the other hand, a family office manager and an 
angel investor wanted to keep the debt moderate. For the family office manager, the 
investment should be about operational excellence instead of financial engineering, and low 
or moderate senior debt would make negotiating with the bank easier. 
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 However, with the lack of PE general partner, all senior lenders were less confident that 
shareholders will provide additional equity if needed. Without general partner and lead 
investor looking after its reputation, banks face the risk of equity investors walking away 
when target company faces challenges. With the searcher typically not investing substantially 
and having only 10-30% of ownership, he was seen to less likely have the same means and 
motivation to provide additional equity, as a PE general partner would. 
The equity portion for a target of EV €2M was seen as quite easy to raise, the EV €20M target 
being more difficult, requiring family offices, institutional investors or PE funds. The size of 
the target company was seen as quite relevant from family office perspective: The target 
company closer to EV €2M than €20M can be too small to larger family offices. For one 
family office manager, even the EV €20M company was slightly too small to invest in. 
The minimum investment range of a family office can also introduce controlling interest that 
differs from the search fund model. In case of smaller companies, minimum investments in 
range of €1M to €10M forces the family offices to become a majority shareholder, effectively 
controlling the company instead of the searcher. If target is in EV 20M, valuation is enough 
to have smaller family offices as minority holders. 
The family office managers, with suitable minimum investment ranges, saw the acquisition 
stage proposals as interesting and potentially fundable. A family office manager noted that 
the six year holding period is suitable and realistic, and the transaction costs (incurred from 
the search stage) are relatively inexpensive, if the target is closer to EV €20M. He pointed out 
how they are avoiding direct startup investments, but also fund management costs. Direct 
investments to companies with moderate risk would be an attractive alternative to him. 
The seller financing can come in various forms, and was not detailed in the transaction 
structure. A transaction advisor noted that an earn out or small equity share held by previous 
owner may support smooth transition. From his perspective, a seller could retain even a 20% 
equity share, reducing the need for additional equity. 
A shareholder agreement was mentioned in two interviews. A transaction advisor pointed out 
that investors will want to tie the searcher to the company in a way or another. In addition to 
own investment, this could be done with vesting schedule and bad leaver terms. A family 
office manager saw that with multiple investors, he would have less control also on the terms 
of the shareholder agreement, potentially favoring the searcher. 
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 A transaction advisor noted that the search fund model is focused on raising acquisition 
capital. Small companies often lack capital required for future growth, but the acquisition 
memorandum omits this aspect. Taking in account the previous finding of investors’ growth 
appetite, and the opportunity for acquisitive growth, this perspective may need to be included 
into the search fund model. 
Search funds are seen as angel investment class to Finnish private equity 
Throughout the interviews, potential investors were often spontaneously comparing search 
funds to private equity as an asset class. On the other hand the investment unit sizes, 
especially with the smaller targets closer to EV €2M, were associated with angel investments. 
In four interviews, the potential investors described search funds as an angel investment class 
for private equity or buyout world. The relationship was compared to stages of angel and VC 
investments in startups. A fund manager went on thinking out loud a value chain, where 
search funds could grow companies to be attractive to national level PEs and buyout funds, 
looking forward to exit the companies to Nordic and international funds. 
With smaller targets closer to EV €2M, the whole transaction was seen as fundable with 
€100-150k business angel tickets and Finnvera guarantees and junior loans. A family office 
manager described that the equity for Fluid partners could be raised from family and friends, 
and a fund manager mentioned how angel investor consortiums would be interested. A 
private banker mentioned how he would be interested on marketing Fluid partners to his 
customers. Four potential investors mentioned that they would be interested in investing as 
private individuals. 
A transaction advisor pointed out that search stage investment could be attractive to legal, 
finance or PR service providers. The model enables them to take more strategic position in a 
business that normally. In addition, search stage investment would enable the angel investors 
to influence the focus of the search can be influenced by the investors. 
Despite the (previously covered) considerations of investing in the search stage, the target 
companies were generally seen as attractive alternatives for startup angel investments. Beside 
the obvious lower downside risk, potential investors saw advantages in the opportunity for 
active sourcing in search stage, and the lower risk for investment turning in to a millstone. 
The lack of novelty and limited upside risks were seen as the only disadvantages. 
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  Perceived search fund advantages Perceived search fund disadvantages 
Compared to 
startup angel 
investments 
Active sourcing in search stage (4) 
No millstones in search stage (2) 
Lower downside risk (2) 
Lower risk for dilution (1) 
Less novelty (1) 
Limited upside (1) 
Compared to 
private 
equity 
investments 
Case-by-case commitment (4) 
Entrepreneur as starting point (3) 
10-30% searcher equity (4) 
Search and DD costs covered (1) 
No diversification (4) 
One-time-only (3) 
Married to management (3) 
10-30% searcher equity (1) 
Table 9: Search fund advantages and disadvantages compared to Angel investments and 
PE with number of interviews these advantages and disadvantages were mentioned. 
In four interviews, search funds were seen as a sourcing model for angel investors. A fund 
manager described how angel investors rarely have the resources for active search, unlike 
larger family offices and PE general partners. Instead, startup entrepreneurs are approaching 
them with proposals of varying quality. With the search fund model, searcher is actively 
searching and screening proposals for the benefit of the investor. As an institutional investor 
pointed out, a searcher should be more cost efficient than angel investor or hired analyst. 
Compared to startups, search fund targets were seen as less risky as they are already 
profitable. Search funds were perceived to have smaller downside risk of losing the invested 
capital. A fund manager pointed out that in the worst case a business matching the search 
fund criteria would be as valuable in exit as it was when acquired. 
In the search stage, investment not becoming a millstone was also seen as an advantage. As a 
transaction advisor mentioned, even if a suitable target is not found, the search stage 
investment is not dragging you, you just underwrite and forget it. In comparison, startups 
often require follow-up investments. 
A transaction advisor described how the initial search stage investment would be a nice 
alternative for diluting or losing your investment with a startup, or spraying your investment 
to overpriced equity crowdfunding projects. 
When compared to private equity investments, case-by-case commitments (with search and 
DD costs covered) and having the entrepreneur as a starting point were seen as advantages. 
The lack of diversification, the one-time-only nature, and being married to the management 
were seen as disadvantages, partly carrying opposite view. The 10-30% searcher equity 
received a mixed feedback. 
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 In four interviews, case-by-case investments through right of first refusal were mentioned as 
attractive compared to traditional PE funds. The search fund model runs with lower 
committed capital, and provides the investor with an opportunity to choose whether to invest 
or not on a case. PE’s rarely offer this opportunity. A fund manager explained how she had 
previously run a PE with case-by-case investment decisions, and had an issue with covering 
search and DD costs on deals that didn’t realize. Search stage funding would solve this issue. 
Having entrepreneur as the starting point, in comparison to PE model, was seen as smart in 
four interviews. A transaction advisor pointed out the advantage of focusing on finding a 
target company, not on finding both the target and the suitable management. A family office 
manager mentioned incentives being well aligned if searcher if searching for a company for 
himself to manage and own.  
On the other hand, being married to management was seen as a disadvantage in three other 
interviews. As PEs can find the best management for a target, search fund lacks this 
opportunity. With up to 30% searcher ownership and minority shareholders, the searcher has 
control of the company instead of a PE general partner. For example, changing the 
management can be a challenge. However, a family office manager pointed out how PEs 
might struggle to find good management for companies with EV of €2M. 
Another disadvantage compared to PE model is that a search fund has no diversification, as it 
acquires only one target company. An institutional investor mentioned that instead of 
investing in just one searcher, some investors could be more happy to invest in five. An angel 
investor pointed out that with the equal sums required for investing in one search fund 
target, he could invest in a number of startups 
In addition, the one-time-only approach was seen as limiting the growth potential of the fund 
in one interview. Two potential investors also worried that the one-time-only nature can 
make the model less interesting for some investors, as there is less continuity and limited 
scope. 
The 10-30% searcher equity share was seen mostly as reasonable reward. A fund manager 
pointed out that the share was well in line with the startup world. For him, it was not 
uncommon for entrepreneurs having a majority share after raising similar amounts of equity, 
and without investing themselves. With search fund model, a holding company structure was 
discussed to enable a desired asymmetry between investors and searchers. 
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 Only one fund manager mentioned the 10-30% equity share to be quite high, compared to 
typical PE management rewards. However, it is worth noting that search fund model is not 
paying any additional carried interest, which should be considered to include in the 10-30%. 
Also the typically larger company sizes account in the difference in management equity. 
A catalyst is needed to create a phenomenon out of search funds 
Most of the potential investors (8) pointed out that a catalyst is required for a Finnish search 
fund model. An institutional investor pointed out, that the successful model in Stanford may 
rely on the strong alumni network, with the alumni having capabilities to invest in searchers. 
There might be a need for the catalyst taking the role of Stanford GSB, raising awareness and 
creating a phenomenon of the model on Finnish market. Without a catalyst, searchers are 
less likely to emerge, and investors can be less attracted to an obscure model. 
In addition to awareness, the catalyst could provide structure, tools and a streamlined 
process to make the search more efficient. The transaction advisors mentioned that common 
tools for the searcher can make the search period shorter. These tools can include tools for 
search and analysis, legal and financial documentation, templates and guidelines, but also 
support services such as tax, legal and financial DDs. 
A fund manager suggested that matching searchers with investors would lower the barrier of 
finding interested investors. He referred to Sitra being one if the instigators of Finnish 
Business Angel Network, which matched 650 angel investors with 400 startups in 2016 
(Finnish Business Angel Network, 2017). A transaction advisor saw the task of finding 
investors willing to invest €150k units the hardest part. As a solution, a few potential 
investors suggested public funding already for the search stage in order to attract private 
investments. 
The catalyst can be either private, or typically for the Finnish ecosystem, a public entity. The 
potential investors mention the following private entities as an option: 
● Private equity fund, with a €10M allocation for search fund investments, 
● Family office, with required public backing for multiple search funds, 
● Crowdfunding platform, with a good reach to potential angel investors, and 
● Accelerator or incubator, with a wide reach of mentors and/or investors 
A public entity was also seen as suitable catalyst, with more neutral position and wider reach. 
The following entities and opportunities were mentioned in interviews: 
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 ● Tekes, by providing Kiito/Tempo like grant (max €50k and 50%) for the search stage, 
● Sitra, by taking a similar role as with Finnish Business Angel Network previously, 
● Tesi, by funding 10 search stages, and the resulting acquisitions with €1M each, and 
● Aalto, by engaging their Alumni network with the search fund model 
Hypothesis regarding search fund as an asset class 
The third hypothesis, “potential investors are more attracted to invest in the acquisition stage 
compared to the search stage” receives strong support. The potential investors identified a 
number of inherent risks regarding search stage investments. Many felt that they already had 
an access to the deals, and saw no point in paying for the sourcing of the deals. The model 
where investor carries all downside risk and searcher none of it was also seen as unbalanced. 
On the other hand, the acquisition stage was seen as very similar to traditional private equity 
investments. As the search fund returns, valuations, and opportunities were seen as 
attractive, number of investors were interested in the acquisition stage investments.  
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 4.3 Summary on Findings 
The findings of the feasibility study can be summarizes with the nine main categories: 
● Independence attracts to search funds, financial security to employment 
● Return versus risk favors search funds over startups as a career choice 
● Opportunity cost and lack of knowledge hold potential searchers back 
● Search fund returns, valuations and opportunities are attractive to investors 
● The ideal searcher is both experienced and an entrepreneur 
● Raising search capital is likely to be a struggle for most searchers 
● Search fund acquisition differs little from PE, growth is expected 
● Search funds are seen as angel investment class to Finnish private equity 
● A catalyst is needed to create a phenomenon out of search funds 
Based on the findings the first two hypotheses “Potential searchers see higher expected 
entrepreneurial profit, lower uncertainty and lower downside risk as search fund’s advantage 
over startups” (H1) and “potential searchers see independence and ability to leverage their 
experience as search fund’s advantage over employment” (H2) are receiving support. 
The third hypothesis of “potential investors are more attracted to invest in the acquisition 
stage compared to the search stage” (H3) receives strong support. Search fund returns, 
valuations and opportunities are attractive to investors, but raising search capital is likely to 
be a struggle for most searchers. 
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 5. Discussion and Conclusions 
The discussions and conclusions chapter aims to answer the research questions, summarize 
and discuss the results with the previously covered literature. The chapter begins with 
Discussion on Search Funds as a Career Choice and as an asset class. The conclusions focus 
on the practical implications of the results, as appropriate for a feasibility study. The chapter 
is closed with limitations of the research and recommendations for further research.  
5.1 Discussion on Search Funds as a Career Choice 
The first research questions for the feasibility study was formalized as “What strengths and 
weaknesses do potential searchers see in search funds as a career choice?” Based on the 
literature review and theoretical framework provided by Shane and Venkataraman (2000), 
two hypotheses were developed. These two hypotheses made predictions on how potential 
searchers would evaluate the search fund instrument, compared to founding a startup and 
employment. 
The first hypothesis, stating that “potential searchers see higher expected entrepreneurial 
profit, lower uncertainty and lower downside risk as search fund’s advantage over startups”, 
is receiving support from the findings. When compared to startups, potential searchers saw 
search funds as providing better returns with lower risk for the entrepreneur. Potential 
searchers acknowledged that most startups fail, and that the “early grinding” of finding a 
sustainable business model can be a struggle. Having a running operation in the acquired 
company seems to be the key enabler for these advantages. 
However, some of the potential searchers were held back because of current commitments, 
such as a startup or a decent job, financial security offered by employment. In addition, 
search fund model was seen to introduce takeover risks that are not present in the startup 
path. These weaknesses can be seen as opportunity costs that the searcher needs to incur. The 
potential searchers appeared to evaluate expected entrepreneurial profit against opportunity 
cost of choosing startup path, but also of the one with employment. The searchers attitudes 
seem to be well in line with the theories of Kirzner and Schumpeter (cited in Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000) on pursuing entrepreneurial opportunities. 
The second hypothesis of “potential searchers see independence and ability to leverage their 
experience as search fund’s advantage over employment” received also some support. 
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 Potential searchers recognized autonomy, freedom, and independent decision making in 
search funds to be the key advantages over employment, as predicted by Shane, Locke & 
Collins (2003) on their article regarding entrepreneurial motivation. Some searchers were 
quite straightforward when describing their frustration in current employment. 
Some potential searchers mentioned search funds enabling them to leverage their skills, for 
example in making business decision and raising capital for acquisition. However, these 
remarks were made in context of comparing search fund to startups. The potential searchers 
seem to align with theories of Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg, predicting individuals with 
useful information for entrepreneurship from their previous employment being more likely to 
exploit entrepreneurial opportunities (cited in Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). However, 
based on the results it seems that the information is perceived to be more useful in some 
entrepreneurial opportunities than others (i.e. search fund or startup). 
On the other hand, the lack of information and experience can also contribute to perceived 
weaknesses of the model. Potential searchers saw the search fund model to require more 
experience, and mentioned lack of knowledge and required experience preventing them of 
choosing the search fund path. Reflecting against Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg (cited in 
Shane and Venkataraman, 2000), the potential searchers may lack the useful information for 
the search fund model. 
Generalizing these results leads us to following proposal:  
Potential searchers seem to prefer search fund over startups and employment, as 
long as (1) expected entrepreneurial profit of search fund is higher than opportunity 
cost of employment or startup, (2) search fund provides more independence than 
employment or startup, and (3) potential searchers have information and 
experience that is useful especially for applying the search fund model. 
5.2 Discussion on Search Funds as an Asset Class 
The second research question was “What strengths and weaknesses do potential Finnish 
investors see in search funds as an asset class?” The complete contracting or agency theory 
(Jensen & Mecklin, 1974; Spier, Hart, Van Osnabrugge, cited in Lahti 2008; Mason and 
Stark, 2010) led to following hypothesis on searcher preferences: “Potential investors are 
more attracted to invest in the acquisition stage compared to the search stage”. 
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 Investors identified a number of strengths in the search fund model. Generally, search fund 
returns, valuations and opportunities were seen as attractive. The search fund model shares 
many workings with the standard PE model which makes evaluating proposals easy. 
Compared to PE, it has the additional advantage of investor making case-by-case decisions. 
The model was positioned as the angel investment stage of PE, where it offered active 
sourcing of deals, which is rarely an option for angel investors and small family offices. 
The only identified weaknesses of the model were related to search capital and the inability to 
change the management like with PE model. The potential investors were not very fond of 
paying for search in advance, compared to paying for closing a deal. Number of investors 
pointed out that the searcher carries no downside risk, and shares only upside with investors. 
Only trusted searcher with exceptional access to deals was seen as potentially fundable. 
From agency theory perspective, both weaknesses can be seen as investor’s desire to place 
bonding costs to the searcher. To guarantee that the searcher (as an agent) is not going to 
take actions harmful for the investor (as a principal), the investor wants the searcher to invest 
ex-ante in building trust, and discount the post-ante risk of being removed from a 
management position. The desire is logical for an investor acting according to the agency 
theory: Moral hazard is bound to occur in the search stage, where the searcher is essentially 
insured by the investor by receiving a salary, despite what the outcome of the search will be. 
The hypothesis of “potential investors are more attracted to invest in the acquisition stage 
compared to the search stage, following the logic of agency theory”, seems to receive support 
from the identified weaknesses. In the Stanford GSB search fund model presented to the 
potential investors, search stage investors are receiving a 1.5x step-up for the search stage 
investment (A Primer on Search Funds, 2013). As the investors are preferring acquisition 
stage despite the step-up, it seems that they are valuating the ex-ante bonding costs to be 
over 50% of their returns. 
Generalizing these results leads us to following proposal: 
Potential investors are more attracted to invest in the acquisition stage compared to 
the search stage, following the logic of agency theory, and are willing to accept 
transaction costs exceeding 50% of their returns. 
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 5.3 Conclusions 
Finnish market is likely to have targets for 4 to 8 searches per year 
Based on the desk study, detailed in the literature review section, no more than 4 to 8 
searches annually are required to cover the potential targets on the Finnish market. The 
number varies on how the market is defined, and how many potential targets need to be 
identified for a one acquisition. 
Three market definitions were used to determine the market potential: 
● Companies with €5-50M revenue provide an opportunity space of 9,101 targets. To 
cover this market, 5 to 18 searches are needed, leading to an estimated total 
acquisition volume of €50M to €180M. 
● 54+ entrepreneurs employing more than 10 provide an opportunity space of 11,000 
targets. To cover this market, 6 to 22 searches are needed, leading to an estimated 
total acquisition volume of €18M to €66M. 
● Companies with €1-5M revenue provide an opportunity space of 21,000 targets. To 
cover this market, 10 to 42 searches are needed, leading to an estimated total 
acquisition volume of €30M to €126M. 
Assuming the pool of potential targets fully replenishing in 10 years on average, no more than 
4 to 8 search acquisitions with a volume of €25M to €36M annually can be sustained for next 
10 years in the Finnish market. 
Acquisition stage is very likely to have investors - search stage less likely 
The empirical results of the study imply that Finnish investors would be interested in the 
acquisition stage. The market opportunity of retiring entrepreneurs is seen as attractive by 
angel investors, family offices and senior lenders. The investors are positioning search funds 
as angel stage PE investments, with little alternatives in <€10M segment and virtually none 
in <€5M. In addition, the search fund acquisition stage differs only little from traditional 
buyout transactions, benefiting from a familiar logic.  
Annual investment of €25M to €36M is estimated to be sufficient to fully cover the market. 
The volume is a fraction of the €453M buyout volume in 2016 (FVCA, 2018). Reaching the 
potential would position the search fund market right next to startup angel investments, 
valued at €53M in 2016 and €26M in 2017, and crowdfunding valued at €34M in 2016 and 
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 €56M in 2017 (Finnish Business Angels Network, 2017). In addition to current angel 
investors, family offices and other investors on the market, search fund acquisitions may also 
attract new equity investors. 
However, raising search capital will be a struggle for most searchers. Investors seem to follow 
the logic of agency theory, and see paid search exposing them to moral hazard. Essentially, 
investors are happy to pay for the deals being closed, but not for the search. According to 
Kolarova et. al. (2016), the situation has been very much similar in other markets adapting 
the model: First searchers have spent most of their effort in explaining the model, instead of 
implementing it. 
Smaller FO’s and some business angels may be the first investors to go along, as they rarely 
have the resources and capabilities for active sourcing. For them, search stage can provide 
cost-effective means for actively sourcing potential targets. However, first searchers in the 
Finnish market likely need to adapt the self-funded variation (Dennis and Laseca, 2016), 
where searcher skips the fundraising for the initial search stage. 
In the end, a catalyst is likely to be required to enable the search stage funding. Catalyst can 
provide matchmaking, facility such as tools and templates, or direct/indirect funding for 
search stage. Catalyst on Finnish market can be for example a private equity, family office, 
crowdfunding platform, accelerator, university, or a public funding institution.  
Finnish market is likely to have searchers, if there are entrepreneurs 
The potential searchers in this study seem to prefer search funds over startups as a career 
choice because of the higher expected entrepreneurial profits and lower downside risk. 
Compared to employment, searchers prefer the independence in search funds, but critically 
weigh the opportunity costs, including the financial security with current employment. 
As the perceived disadvantages are essentially the same with all forms of entrepreneurship, 
but perceived advantages specific to the search fund model, the model should be an attractive 
alternative to other forms of entrepreneurship. Assuming the sample is accurately 
representing the potential searchers, number of potential searchers should not be a 
bottleneck for the model. 
Few searchers pointed out that lack of knowledge and (confidence in) required skills was one 
of the elements holding them back. In more generalized form the study proposes that 
potential searchers are more likely to pursue search fund career, if they have useful 
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 information or experience to do it. Again, this can be seen as an opportunity for a catalyst, 
which may provide training for the potential searchers. 
Most investors preferred searchers with entrepreneurial experience. The opportunity cost 
holding back can be low especially with entrepreneurs who have recently given up their 
companies. With 324 startup CEOs raising angel investment every year, and all of them 
facing a (desired or undesired) liquidity event in a few years, there shouldn’t be a lack of 
growth hungry individuals with entrepreneurial experience. 
5.4 Limitations of the Study 
To the author’s knowledge, this study is the first one to evaluate the feasibility of the search 
fund model on the Finnish market. As such, it is far from complete, but hopefully provides 
some insight on what constraints and stakeholder expectations need to be taken in account. 
The qualitative approach can be argued as most suitable for the subject matter, but comes 
with limitations. Generalizability of the results is limited, especially with the sample of 
potential searchers. Most of the potential searchers reached through Aalto alumni channels 
and Haaga-Helia MBA program had plenty of industry experience, but were lacking with 
entrepreneurial experience. In hindsight, knowing the expectations of the investors, more 
participants with entrepreneurial experience should have been included in the study.  
One major limitation is the lack of sellers view. It can be argued that from seller’s perspective 
the transaction should not technically differ, be the buyer a searcher, private equity or some 
other entity. On the other hand, selling a business can be a highly emotional experience, 
where the buyer’s profile can matter very much. Unfortunately this perspective could not be 
included in the scope. 
Finally, the study provides insights on stakeholder expectations, but little on how the model 
could actually be implemented in Finland. For this, a more inquiry on the historical 
development of search fund model in forerunner markets (e.g. US, UK, Spain) would have 
been useful.  
5.5 Suggestions for Further Research  
From more practical perspective, the feasibility study has provided a setting for wider action 
research project. The following steps would include action planning, implementation and 
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 evaluation, and progressing through these cycles toward an operating Finnish search fund 
model. 
From more theoretical perspective, search funds can provide a special subject matter for 
contracting theory. The model has a number of sequential contracts in place, with various 
types of asymmetric information and agency costs involved. 
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Appendix A: 
“Funded Search” presentation by Prof. 
Peter Kelly for potential searcher focus 
groups 
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C o m p a n y E B I T D A $ 1 . 0 m $ 1 . 4 m
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• L o o k e d  a t  1 0 0 +  p o t e n t i a l  d e a l s
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m i l l i o n
• T r a d e  s a l e

Appendix B: 
“Palveluksessa Suomi Oy - Funded search 
case study on the Finnish market” 
presentation by Mikko Järvinen for 
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Appendix C: 
“Sample Search Fund Memorandum” 
research instrument for interviewing 
potential investors regarding the search 
stage investments 
  
Sample Search Fund Memorandum 
Executive Summary 
SSF Oy (Sample Search Fund) is formed to identify, acquire and operate an existing Finnish 
private company with an initial enterprise value between €2 and €20 million and EBITDA 
margin of 10% or more. 
 
The Sample Search Fund will allow the Searcher to conduct a full-time search for a period of 
up to 18 months. After a target company is identified and acquired, the Searcher becomes 
the CEO of the acquired company, and receives 10-30% ownership in the company. 
 
The Sample Search Fund targets a 30% compound annual return on investor capital, 
reflecting the historical performance of search funds in US and Canada. The 258 search 
funds tracked by Stanford GSB have achieved an aggregate ROI of 8.4x and an IRR of 
36.7%, with considerably low survival and liquidity risk. 
 
Investment in Sample Search Fund should be viewed as a long-term investment. Investor 
returns will primarily come from the Searcher’s ability to increase the value of the acquired 
company. The Sample Search Fund expects to provide investors with a liquidity event 
between four and six years after acquisition. 
Investment structure 
The Sample Search Fund is raising €150k through the sale of 10 investment units (“Units”) 
priced at €15k each. This initial capital is intended to sustain a dedicated search for up to 
18 months. For each Unit purchased, investors will receive: 
 
● Right of First Refusal.​ Investors will have the right, but not the obligation, to 
participate in financing the acquisition. Depending on the size and structure of the 
acquisition, investors are expected to have the opportunity to invest another €100k to 
€200k per unit at the time of acquisition. Investors will be given the opportunity to 
provide 100% of the required equity capital in order to prevent dilution from outside 
investors. 
● Investment Step-Up​. All Units will be converted to securities in the acquired company 
and stepped-up by 50%, structured as a combination of equity and subordinated debt 
on terms pari pasu with the investor capital provided in the acquisition round of 
financing (i.e., for every $1.00 invested in The Sample Search Fund the investor will 
receive $1.50 of securities of the acquired company). This 50% step-up is meant to 
compensate the initial investors for the increased risk of investing in the first round of 
financing. 
 
The Sample Search Fund intends to finance the acquisition through a combination of bank 
debt, subordinated debt, seller financing and investor capital, which may include 
subordinated debt, preferred stock and common stock. 
 
The Searcher will earn an equity interest in return for identifying and acquiring the target 
company, and for achieving agreed upon operating results. The Searcher will have the 
opportunity to earn between 10-30% of the common equity, depending on the ultimate size 
and structure of the acquisition. A portion of this equity will be subject to meeting 
pre-established performance benchmarks. Neither the investors’ nor the Searcher’s upside 
is limited in any way. 
Search strategy 
The ultimate goal of the search strategy is to generate enough high-quality deal flow to close 
a transaction in not more than 18 months. The Sample Search Fund will perform an 
opportunistic nationwide search to generate deals that meet it’s acquisition criteria. At a 
minimum, companies must possess the following characteristics: 
 
Minimum attributes 
● Niche mfg or service business 
● Mgmt transition or absentee owner 
● Privately-held, based in Finland 
● 3 year history of profitability 
● Minimum EBITDA margin of 10% 
● Minimum annual EBITDA of €0.5m 
Quality dimensions 
● Quality of people 
● Quality of industry 
● Quality of cash flows 
● Quality of market position 
● Quality of operations 
● Quality of liquidity options 
 
The Searcher anticipates forming an Advisory Board of between three to five investors with 
relevant experience in sourcing opportunities and investing in private companies. The 
Advisory Board will be used as a sounding board for prospective investment theses and as 
references that may be used to establish credibility with business owners. 
 
While a variety of sourcing alternatives exist for the opportunistic searcher, each alternative 
requires a different level of time and financial commitment to generate a specific volume and 
quality of deal flow. The Searcher believes the key to a successful opportunistic search is to 
balance the use of these sourcing alternatives in a focused manner while also factoring in 
his 
professional experience and personal preferences. 
 
The specific sources The Sample Search Fund will use to generate deal flow are as follows: 
 
● Business brokers 
● Small (investment) banks 
● Direct marketing & cold calling 
● Network with deal professionals and service providers 
● Personal networks 
● Buy-side brokers 
● Advertising and public relations 
Searcher options 
Searcher profiles for the Sample Search Fund 
Searcher A 
● 30 year old 
● MSc Econ. (Finance) 
● 5 years of experience in investment banking and/or private equity 
Searcher B 
● 40 year old 
● Bachelor of Hospitality Management, now studying MBA 
● 20 years of industry experience specifically in catering and food industry 
● 10 years of experience in management positions 
Searcher C 
● 40 year old 
● Bachelor of Engineering, now studying MBA 
● 20 years of multi-industry experience in management positions 
● 10 years of entrepreneurial experience, including startup CEO 
Searcher D 
● 50 year old 
● MBA, MSc Econ or Tech (Industrial Engineering) 
● 25 years of multi-industry experience, director positions in TE500 companies 
● Also some entrepreneurial experience and/or VC fund management experience 
 
  
Search Stage Budget Estimate 
Solo search for 18 months in EUR 
 
Operations  
Searcher Draw -75 000 
Benefits & Insurance -25 000 
Travel -10 000 
Rent & Office Expenses -20 000 
Marketing -10 000 
Diligence and advisors -10 000 
Operations total -150 000 
Financing  
Equity (10 x €15k investment units)  150 000 
Financing total 150 000 
Net  
Net cash flow 0 
 
 
  
Appendix D: 
“Fluid Partners Financing Memorandum” 
research instrument for interviewing 
potential investors regarding the 
acquisition stage investments 
  
Fluid Partners Financing Memorandum 
Executive summary 
The Company 
Fluid Partners Oy (pseudonym) was founded in 1997 to provide vegetable oil recycling 
service for the food industry. The company is able to recycle the vegetable oil used in 
production facilities and restaurants, and return the oil for use in either food industry or as a 
fuel. The process effectively reduces customer’s waste and material costs, and enables 
them to conform with various legal requirements. 
 
The company owns one of the only centralized oil recycling facilities in the southern finland, 
enabling a well defendable position in its niche market. The company is well established with 
2.4 million euros of revenue and EBITDA of 394 thousand euros in 2016. The company is 
debt-free, and has 996 thousand euros of cash & equivalent. For detailed financial history 
see the appendix. 
 
Sample Search Fund has identified Fluid Partners Oy as an acquisition candidate following a 
detailed examination of the food industry. Sample Search Fund approached the owners, and 
after lengthy discussions, negotiated a detailed letter of intent. 
The Transaction 
The purchase price for Fluid Partners Oy is 2.5 million euros for 100% of the outstanding 
stock. We believe this price represents a favorable multiple of cash flows and earnings 
given the business' profitability, historical growth rate, and future earnings potential: 
 
● 6.3 times 2016 EBITDA 
● 1 times 2016 sales 
● 1.8 times net current assets 
 
Based on preliminary conversations with cash flow lenders, Sample Search Fund anticipates 
the following capital structure to finance this acquisition's purchase and closing costs: 
 
● 1.25 million euros of senior debt 
● 1 million euros of investor capital (structured as 50% subordinated debt, 50% equity) 
● 250 thousand euros of seller financing 
 
To finance this transaction Sample Search Fund will assume additional debt financing to the 
extent that it is available on favorable terms and up to a prudent level of cash flow coverage. 
Using the above capital structure, conservative assumptions for growth and profitability, 
and a planned sale of Fluid Partners Oy in 5 years, Sample Search Fund forecasts an equity 
investor IRR of 30%. 
 
Post-Acquisition Strategy 
Following completion of the acquisition, the new management plans to continue Fluid 
Partners Oy's profitable participation in the current vegetable oil recycling business as well 
as to pursue new opportunities for profitable growth. 
 
New management plans to continue profitable growth by: 
 
● Entering new markets (fe. Saint Petersburg region) 
● Seeking follow-on acquisitions in complementary businesses 
● Examining R&D opportunities in miniaturisation of oil recycling technology 
 
New management also intends to examine a number of initiatives to reduce overall operating 
costs. These activities include: 
 
● Increasing attention to, and management of, the Company's vendor network 
● Focusing greater attention on operating costs related to specific customers 
● Increasing the resource efficiency of the recycling processes 
 
Following the acquisition, the Searcher will assume the role of Fluid Partners’s CEO. In 
addition, as a condition to closing this transaction, Fluid Partners Oy's current president has 
agreed to enter into an employment contract with the Company for a period of not less than 
six months following the closing date. 
 
During this period, the Seller will facilitate a smooth transition of the Company's day-to-day 
operations and important relationships as well as continue to function as a key salesperson 
on a commission basis. 
 
 SUOMEN KASVIOLJYKIERRATYS OY
LOIMAA, Finland
 
Active Private
BvD ID n° FI10988702 The Global Ultimate Owner of this controlled subsidiary is MR JUKKA-
PEKKA TURPEINEN
 
Global standard format
Unconsolidated, Local registry filing
 
 31/12/2016 31/12/2015 31/12/2014 31/12/2013 31/12/2012 31/12/2011
 EUR EUR EUR EUR EUR EUR
 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months
 Local GAAP Local GAAP Local GAAP Local GAAP Local GAAP Local GAAP
Balance sheet       
      
Assets       
Fixed assets 193,000 163,000 181,000 211,643 232,000 229,000
Intangible fixed assets 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tangible fixed assets 193,000 163,000 173,000 203,463 224,000 221,000
Other fixed assets 0 0 8,000 8,180 8,000 8,000
Current assets 1,514,000 1,508,000 1,291,000 1,314,036 1,092,000 941,000
Stock 58,000 35,000 32,000 101,826 114,000 151,000
Debtors 102,000 272,000 96,000 158,625 97,000 82,000
Other current assets 1,354,000 1,201,000 1,163,000 1,053,585 881,000 708,000
 ∟ Cash & cash equivalent 996,000 747,000 729,000 589,686 649,000 600,000
Total assets 1,707,000 1,672,000 1,471,000 1,525,679 1,325,000 1,170,000
      
Liabilities & equity       
Shareholders funds 1,534,000 1,537,000 1,356,000 1,409,932 1,227,000 995,000
Capital 8,000 8,000 8,000 8,409 8,000 8,000
Other shareholders funds 1,526,000 1,529,000 1,348,000 1,401,523 1,219,000 987,000
Non-current liabilities 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0
Long term debt n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other non-current liabilities n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
 ∟ Provisions n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Current liabilities 173,000 135,000 116,000 115,744 97,000 175,000
Loans 0 0 0 0 0 0
Creditors 51,000 33,000 38,000 26,827 18,000 3,000
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 31/12/2016 31/12/2015 31/12/2014 31/12/2013 31/12/2012 31/12/2011
 EUR EUR EUR EUR EUR EUR
 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months
Other current liabilities 122,000 102,000 78,000 88,917 79,000 172,000
Total shareh. funds & liab. 1,707,000 1,672,000 1,471,000 1,525,679 1,325,000 1,170,000
      
Memo lines       
Working capital 109,000 274,000 90,000 233,624 193,000 230,000
Net current assets 1,341,000 1,373,000 1,175,000 1,198,292 995,000 766,000
Enterprise value n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Number of employees 10 8 8 n.a. 6 8
      
Profit & loss account       
Operating revenue (Turnover) 2,380,000 1,923,000 1,788,000 2,232,050 2,069,000 2,129,000
 ∟ Sales 2,380,000 1,923,000 1,788,000 2,231,918 2,069,000 2,130,000
Costs of goods sold n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Gross profit n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other operating expenses n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Operating P/L [=EBIT] 330,000 260,000 48,000 371,728 375,000 533,000
Financial P/L 7,000 7,000 22,000 14,113 10,000 5,000
 ∟ Financial revenue 7,000 7,000 22,000 14,118 11,000 18,000
 ∟ Financial expenses n.a. 0 n.a. 5 1,000 13,000
P/L before tax 338,000 267,000 70,000 385,842 385,000 538,000
Taxation 67,000 53,000 12,000 93,359 93,000 147,000
P/L after tax 271,000 214,000 58,000 292,483 292,000 391,000
Extr. and other P/L n.a. 76,000 n.a. -100 n.a. 19,000
 ∟ Extr. and other revenue n.a. 76,000 n.a. n.a. n.a. 19,000
 ∟ Extr. and other expenses n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a. n.a.
P/L for period [=Net income] 270,000 290,000 58,000 292,382 292,000 411,000
      
Memo lines       
Export revenue n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Material costs 959,000 675,000 789,000 825,639 752,000 595,000
Costs of employees 574,000 535,000 463,000 509,334 428,000 472,000
Depreciation & Amortization 64,000 59,000 61,000 69,393 75,000 74,000
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 31/12/2016 31/12/2015 31/12/2014 31/12/2013 31/12/2012 31/12/2011
 EUR EUR EUR EUR EUR EUR
 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months
Other operating items 451,000 392,000 427,000 455,954 438,000 n.a.
Interest paid n.a. n.a. n.a. 5 1,000 13,000
Research & Development 
expenses
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cash flow 334,000 349,000 119,000 361,775 367,000 485,000
Added value n.a. n.a. n.a. 964,473 889,000 1,117,000
EBITDA 394,000 319,000 109,000 441,121 450,000 607,000
 
 31/12/2010 31/12/2009 31/12/2008 31/12/2007
 EUR EUR EUR EUR
 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months
Other operating items n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Interest paid 4,000 5,000 4,000 7,015
Research & Development 
expenses
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cash flow 316,000 138,000 334,000 n.a.
Added value 767,000 474,000 660,000 n.a.
EBITDA 411,000 171,000 373,000 n.a.
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Appendix E: 
“Blastproof Financing Memorandum” 
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 Blastproof Financing Memorandum 
Executive summary 
The Company 
Blastproof Oy is a leading provider of blast protection and special ventilation technology 
applied in protective constructions such as civilian shelters, hardened military facilities and 
the chemical and petrochemical industry. 
 
The company was established in 1953, and became market leader in Finnish civil defence 
shelter equipment by 1963. Since 2010 the company has been growing globally in the 
industrial protection market. The company specializes in products and services related to 
blast protection, CBRN filtration & ventilation, and shock & vibration isolation. 
 
The company generated annual revenue of 19.6 million euros and EBITDA of 3.394 million 
euros in 2016. For detailed financial history see the appendix. 
 
Following a detailed examination, Sample Search Fund has identified Blastproof Oy as an 
acquisition candidate. Sample Search Fund approached the owners, and after lengthy 
discussions, negotiated a detailed letter of intent. 
The Transaction 
The purchase price for Blastproof Oy is 19.6 million euros for 100% of the outstanding 
stock. We believe this price represents a favorable multiple of cash flows and earnings 
given the business' profitability, historical growth rate, and future earnings potential: 
 
● 5.8 times 2016 EBITDA 
● 1 times 2016 sales 
● 1.6 times net current assets 
 
Based on preliminary conversations with cash flow lenders, Sample Search Fund anticipates 
the following capital structure to finance this acquisition's purchase and closing costs: 
 
● 9.8 million euros of senior debt 
● 7.8 million euros of investor capital (structured as 50% subordinated debt, 50% 
equity) 
● 2 million euros of seller financing 
 
To finance this transaction Sample Search Fund will assume additional debt financing to the 
extent that it is available on favorable terms and up to a prudent level of cash flow coverage. 
Using the above capital structure, conservative assumptions for growth and profitability, 
and a planned sale of Blastproof Oy in 5 years, Sample Search Fund forecasts an equity 
investor IRR of 30%. 
  
Post-Acquisition Strategy 
Following completion of the acquisition, the new management plans to continue Blastproof 
Oy's profitable participation in the current industrial protection market as well as to pursue 
new opportunities for profitable growth. 
 
New management plans to continue profitable growth by: 
 
● Seeking follow-on acquisitions in complementary businesses 
● Examining R&D opportunities in company’s three key business areas 
 
New management also intends to examine a number of initiatives to reduce overall operating 
costs. These activities include: 
 
● Increasing attention to, and management of, the Company's vendor network 
● Focusing greater attention on operating costs related to specific products 
● Increasing the efficiency of the manufacturing process 
 
Following the acquisition, the Searcher will assume the role of Blastproof Oy's CEO. In 
addition, as a condition to closing this transaction, Blastproof Oy's current president has 
agreed to enter into an employment contract with the Company for a period of not less than 
six months following the closing date. 
 
During this period, the Seller will facilitate a smooth transition of the Company's day-to-day 
operations and important relationships as well as continue to function as a key salesperson 
on a commission basis. 
 
Global standard format
Unconsolidated, Local registry filing
31/12/2016 31/12/2015 31/12/2014 31/12/2013 31/12/2012 31/12/2011
EUR EUR EUR EUR EUR EUR
12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months
Local GAAP Local GAAP Local GAAP Local GAAP Local GAAP Local GAAP
Balance sheet
Assets
Fixed assets 1,925,000 1,588,045 1,948,614 2,242,853 2,553,491 2,314,844
Intangible fixed assets 903,000 882,430 1,081,235 1,275,191 1,483,585 1,701,735
Tangible fixed assets 1,022,000 705,615 867,379 637,662 739,906 613,109
Other fixed assets 0 0 0 330,000 330,000 0
Current assets 17,812,000 10,948,538 10,143,974 11,450,796 11,645,623 15,434,308
Stock 3,630,000 3,736,401 3,870,336 3,983,897 3,865,031 4,944,929
Debtors 7,508,000 2,222,619 4,615,331 3,809,041 4,103,184 2,908,762
Other current assets 6,674,000 4,989,518 1,658,307 3,657,858 3,677,408 7,580,617
 ∟ Cash & cash equivalent 518,000 2,511,303 1,508,882 787,010 973,207 136,898
Total assets 19,738,000 12,536,589 12,092,593 13,693,649 14,199,119 17,749,157
Liabilities & equity
Shareholders funds 13,800,000 10,039,396 8,843,044 8,880,039 8,056,766 11,288,498
Capital 228,000 228,150 228,150 228,150 228,150 228,150
Other shareholders funds 13,572,000 9,811,246 8,614,894 8,651,889 7,828,616 11,060,348
Non-current liabilities 648,000 577,146 263,962 476,000 950,000 1,330,000
Long term debt 453,000 577,146 263,962 476,000 650,000 910,000
Other non-current liabilities 195,000 0 0 0 300,000 420,000
 ∟ Provisions 195,000 0 0 0 n.a. n.a.
Current liabilities 5,290,000 1,920,045 2,985,586 4,337,609 5,192,351 5,130,658
Loans 181,000 239,119 641,920 276,000 260,000 260,000
Creditors 1,298,000 302,858 462,904 453,252 480,626 756,095
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 31/12/2010 31/12/2009 31/12/2008 31/12/2007
 EUR EUR EUR EUR
 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months
 Local GAAP Local GAAP Local GAAP Local GAAP
Balance sheet     
    
Assets     
Fixed assets 1,512,189 1,292,812 948,857 800,762
Intangible fixed assets 802,104 884,060 452,719 407,278
Tangible fixed assets 710,085 408,752 496,138 393,484
Other fixed assets 0 0 0 0
Current assets 14,874,955 15,089,083 15,082,758 13,930,246
Stock 4,609,242 4,063,190 3,972,983 3,984,575
Debtors 2,489,696 3,536,563 2,235,135 2,442,580
Other current assets 7,776,017 7,489,330 8,874,640 7,503,091
 ∟ Cash & cash equivalent 255,141 140,684 1,728,906 307,585
Total assets 16,387,145 16,381,901 16,031,619 14,731,013
    
Liabilities & equity     
Shareholders funds 11,284,752 11,377,904 10,789,118 10,306,700
Capital 228,150 228,150 228,150 228,150
Other shareholders funds 11,056,602 11,149,754 10,560,968 10,078,550
Non-current liabilities 0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Long term debt n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other non-current liabilities n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
 ∟ Provisions n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Current liabilities 5,102,394 5,003,994 5,242,499 4,424,311
Loans 0 0 0 0
Creditors 432,503 920,217 389,909 473,758
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 31/12/2016 31/12/2015 31/12/2014 31/12/2013 31/12/2012 31/12/2011
 EUR EUR EUR EUR EUR EUR
 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months
Other current liabilities 3,811,000 1,378,068 1,880,762 3,608,357 4,451,725 4,114,563
Total shareh. funds & liab. 19,738,000 12,536,589 12,092,593 13,693,649 14,199,119 17,749,157
      
Memo lines       
Working capital 9,840,000 5,656,162 8,022,763 7,339,686 7,487,589 7,097,596
Net current assets 12,522,000 9,028,493 7,158,388 7,113,187 6,453,272 10,303,650
Enterprise value n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Number of employees 77 77 81 84 90 90
      
Profit & loss account       
Operating revenue (Turnover) 19,565,000 16,324,163 19,795,568 15,571,209 20,788,583 17,007,471
 ∟ Sales 19,429,000 15,879,664 19,390,711 15,525,871 21,067,535 16,538,843
Costs of goods sold n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Gross profit n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other operating expenses n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Operating P/L [=EBIT] 2,813,000 2,273,477 3,293,252 1,191,290 2,072,121 -904,777
Financial P/L 41,000 -27,077 -29,056 -32,930 -4,831,345 51,495
 ∟ Financial revenue 100,000 4,785 9,673 11,147 8,243 147,530
 ∟ Financial expenses 59,000 31,862 38,729 44,077 4,839,588 96,035
P/L before tax 2,853,000 2,246,401 3,264,196 1,158,360 -2,759,223 -853,281
Taxation 577,000 450,649 657,081 275,088 475,481 2,972
P/L after tax 2,276,000 1,795,752 2,607,115 883,272 -3,234,704 -856,253
Extr. and other P/L n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 860,000
 ∟ Extr. and other revenue n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 860,000
 ∟ Extr. and other expenses n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
P/L for period [=Net income] 2,277,000 1,795,752 2,607,115 883,272 -3,234,704 3,746
      
Memo lines       
Export revenue n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Material costs 3,957,000 3,661,248 5,531,140 3,852,033 7,112,407 7,027,913
Costs of employees 5,236,000 4,896,137 5,518,784 5,254,862 5,515,537 5,223,214
Depreciation & Amortization 581,000 613,835 411,849 432,222 462,452 422,865
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 31/12/2010 31/12/2009 31/12/2008 31/12/2007
 EUR EUR EUR EUR
 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months
Other current liabilities 4,669,891 4,083,777 4,852,590 3,950,553
Total shareh. funds & liab. 16,387,145 16,381,901 16,031,619 14,731,013
    
Memo lines     
Working capital 6,666,435 6,679,536 5,818,209 5,953,397
Net current assets 9,772,561 10,085,089 9,840,259 9,505,935
Enterprise value n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Number of employees 70 68 63 58
    
Profit & loss account     
Operating revenue (Turnover) 11,821,800 13,619,104 18,378,234 16,360,850
 ∟ Sales 12,003,900 13,330,609 17,937,540 16,412,290
Costs of goods sold n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Gross profit n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other operating expenses n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Operating P/L [=EBIT] -851,685 188,871 3,016,669 1,582,311
Financial P/L 308,532 311,061 442,103 302,367
 ∟ Financial revenue 328,388 314,827 465,567 315,498
 ∟ Financial expenses 19,856 3,766 23,464 13,131
P/L before tax -543,153 499,932 3,458,771 1,884,678
Taxation n.a. 211,146 176,353 75,893
P/L after tax -543,153 288,786 3,282,418 1,808,785
Extr. and other P/L 450,000 300,000 -2,800,000 -1,600,000
 ∟ Extr. and other revenue 450,000 300,000 n.a. n.a.
 ∟ Extr. and other expenses n.a. n.a. 2,800,000 1,600,000
P/L for period [=Net income] -93,153 588,786 482,418 208,785
    
Memo lines     
Export revenue n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Material costs 3,876,282 4,651,876 5,751,246 6,333,782
Costs of employees 4,194,042 4,161,695 4,465,460 4,121,433
Depreciation & Amortization 342,303 281,757 268,633 249,502
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 31/12/2016 31/12/2015 31/12/2014 31/12/2013 31/12/2012 31/12/2011
 EUR EUR EUR EUR EUR EUR
 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months
Other operating items 6,979,000 4,879,462 5,040,540 4,840,904 5,626,062 n.a.
Interest paid 59,000 31,862 38,729 44,077 109,588 96,035
Research & Development 
expenses
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cash flow 2,858,000 2,409,587 3,018,964 1,315,494 -2,772,252 426,611
Added value 8,730,000 7,788,235 9,233,558 6,889,521 3,328,354 5,748,832
EBITDA 3,394,000 2,887,312 3,705,101 1,623,512 2,534,573 -481,912
 
 31/12/2010 31/12/2009 31/12/2008 31/12/2007
 EUR EUR EUR EUR
 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months
Other operating items n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Interest paid 19,856 3,766 23,464 13,131
Research & Development 
expenses
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cash flow 249,150 870,543 751,051 458,287
Added value n.a. 5,247,150 5,416,328 4,668,744
EBITDA -509,382 470,628 3,285,302 1,831,813
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